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FROM DEFECT TO CAUSE TO
COMPARATIVE FAULT-RETHINKING
SOME PRODUCT LIABILITY CONCEPTS
AARON D. TWERSKI*
INTRODUCTION
More than a decade has passed since the onset of the prod-
ucts liability revolution.' In this period of time literally thou-
sands of judicial opinions have sought to identify and clarify
the ramifications of the shift from the doctrine of negligence to
that of strict liability as the judicial standard to govern actions
arising from injuries caused by defective and dangerous prod-
ucts.2 At first blush it would appear that there is general agree-
* B.S., University of Wisconsin; J.D., Marquette University; Teaching Fellow,
Harvard Law School, 1966-67; Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Hofstra Univer-
sity.
This paper was prepared during a period in which the author was involved in a
study sponsored by the National Science Foundation, entitled PRODUCT LIABILITY: A
STUDY OF THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, Grant Number GI-34857, and was
presented, along with others, at a symposium entitled Crisis in Accident Loss Repara-
tions-What Can Be Done About It?, held at Oconomowoc, Wisconsin, October 12-
13, 1976, and sponsored by the Graduate School of Business and the Law School of
the University of Wisconsin. Although this paper developed apart from the National
Science Foundation study, the contributions of Professor William Donaher of the Du-
quesne Law School and Professors Alvin Weinstein and Henry Piehler of Carnegie-
Mellon University-co-members of that NSF study team-to my overall thinking
are gratefully acknowledged.
1. The onset of the products liability era can be variously marked by Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 1161 A.2d 69 (1960) or Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). See, Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960). The adoption by the American Law Institute of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965) triggered a revolution in American tort law establishing strict
liability. In 1972 Professor Dix Noel had noted that some 36 jurisdictions had expressed
their general approval of the strict liability doctrine. Noel, Defective Products: A bnor-
mal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of the Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93
n. 4 (1972). See PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) § 4050 for a listing of the states accepting strict
liability doctrines. The most recent adoptions of strict liability doctrine have been by
the Alabama and Florida courts. See Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 295 Ala. -,
335 So. 2d 134 (1976); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
2. The volume of litigation can be somewhat gauged by the number of reported
products liability decisions. The PRODUCTS LIABILrrY REPORTER published by Commerce
Clearing House has reported approximately 144,000 decisions since 1970 alone. The
National Commission on Product Safety estimated that in 1969 approximately 300,000
products suits were filed. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY (June, 1970).
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ment throughout the country as to the meaning and import of
strict liability. The courts do indeed seem to be speaking in one
tongue. If the results appear inconsistent it is seemingly to be
attributed to the reaction of courts to differing fact pat-
terns-no judicial system can nor should immunize itself from
the compelling impact of the case at bar. Such, I believe, is the
orthodox view of the present litigation situation.3 It is, in my
considered opinion, seriously in error. We have permitted the
cosmetic sameness of the legal jargon to hide fundamental dif-
ferences of opinion as to the meaning of the strict liability
doctrine. This triumph of language over analysis has not only
masked and debased the judicial dialogue between courts of
different jurisdictions; it has also managed to confuse the inter-
nal logic of some of the most perceptive courts in the country.
It is to a careful delineation of these issues that I now turn.
I. How STRICT IS STRICT LIABILITY?
The starting point for any discussion of the developments
in products liability is the law of negligence. The hallmark of
negligence theory is the requirement that plaintiff establish
that the defendant fails to act as a "reasonable man" would
under the circumstances.4 It should be noted that negligence
theory provides no guarantee nor promise that the product is
One can only guess at the volume of litigation brought on by increased consumer
awareness in more recent years.
3. This proposition is difficult to support by direct authority, yet the treatment of
products liability material by the leading case-books supports this thesis. See, e.g., C.
GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (2d ed. 1969); W. PROSSER, J.
WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (26th ed. 1976).
These texts present the materials in such a manner as to indicate fundamental agree-
ment with the basic principles involved. J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS
PROCESS (1975) undertakes a rather novel approach to the product liability action
which mainly reflects their view that the litigation process treats certain categories of
products cases in a very different manner. For a full development of their thesis, see
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits
of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1973). For a sharp rebuttal to Henderson, see
Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher, & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product
Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings], and finally the
counter to the rebuttal, see Henderson, Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL
L. REv. 541 (1976).
4. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 at 149 (4th ed. 1971); Green, The Negligence
Action, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 369; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965). When
I use the term "reasonable man," it is only because that is the traditional verbiage. I
do not mean, for a moment, to imply that women are excluded. In fact I prefer "reason-
able person" and will use that terminology throughout.
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not defective. The law does not assure a buyer or user that the
product will meet a certain standard of quality-only that the
defendant, through negligent conduct, will not bring about a
defective product. 5 In assessing the buyer's expectations under
negligence law and his possible responses through his conduct
to the product, the very best that a buyer or user can anticipate
is a product that is nonnegligently produced.
The shift to strict liability theory, as expressed in
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A and adopted by
the large majority of states, accomplished a major doctrinal
shift-the focus of attention is no longer the conduct of the
defendant but rather the product in its use environment.6 If the
product is defective it no longer matters how it came to be
defective. All the care in the world will not absolve a defendant
who has sold a defective product which causes injury to a plain-
tiff.7 The tort is no longer the conduct of the defendant which
gave birth to the defect; the tort is selling a defective product.
A. Defective Product-Competing Theories
The concept of "defect" in product liability law has been
the cause of enormous confusion in the profession. Everyone
agrees that for a product to be a likely subject for a products
suit it must have a defect; but there is considerable disagree-
ment as to just what attributes of a product will, when added
together, make one out.8 The confusion reigns so supreme that
several major courts have eschewed giving content to the con-
cept of defect.9 And the Wisconsin Supreme Court after first
5. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment a (1965).
7. Id.
8. This confusion is not unlike that engendered by the common-law concept of
domicile where there was seemingly complete agreement among the courts that every
human being had one and only one domicile. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS §§ 11-23 (1971). Because of the differing interpretations of domiciliary facts
more than one court could conclude that it was in fact the one domicile. See In Re
Dorrances's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932); 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601 (1934),
and the constitutional acceptance of this doctrine, Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315
U.S. 343 (1941); Williams v. North Carolina [I], 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v.
North Carolina [II], 325 U.S. 226, reh. denied 325 U.S. 895 (1945).
9. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975);
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972);
Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973); Berkebile v.
Brantley Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). But see Greiner
v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselleschaft, 540 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1976); Bair v. American
Motors Corp., 535 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1976); Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp.
19771
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solemnly proclaiming that a plaintiff may be able to establish
a cause of action for negligence even when unable to establish
an action for strict liability " later split sharply as to whether
in a negligence action the plaintiff had to establish that the
defect in a product had to be "unreasonably dangerous"!"
Such illogic emanating from one of the most respected courts
in the country gives evidence of fundamental misunderstan-
ding as to the nature and source of strict liability law.
The illusiveness of the "defect" concept is, in this author's
opinion, attributable to the failure to clearly delineate the
differences between: (1) "production" or "manufacturing" de-
fect and "design" defect cases and (2) representational theo-
ries and "unreasonable risk" theories, as the basis for product
liability law. The confusion born from the failure to indicate
what theory is being advocated in any particular case when
added to some holdover semantic problems from the yesteryear
of product liability law has precluded the establishment of an
understandable definition of defect.
B. Production Defect-Design Defect
The doctrine of strict tort liability for products was first
recognized in the context of production defect cases. The typi-
cal case was that of the exploding soda bottle.' 2 An injured
plaintiff who sought to sue the glass manufacturer or bottler'
3
1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975), refusing to follow Berkebile as an illogical plurality opinion in
which the majority of the court did not join. See also the excellent discussion in
Comment, Elimination of "Unreasonably Dangerous" from § 402A-The Price of Con-
sumer Safety, 14 DUQ. L. REv. 25 (1975).
10. Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326,
230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
11. Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1975); Greiten v. La
Dow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975). It should be noted that in a strict liability
action the Wisconsin court has taken the position that a plaintiff must establish that
the product is unreasonably dangerous. Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 110,
240 N.W.2d 154 (1976).
12. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1954).
13. In the case of multiple defendants, it was the plaintiffs' responsibility to point
the accusing finger at the particular defendant. If negligence was established, but it
was not clear which defendant was responsible for the negligence, plaintiff would not
prevail. This remains a problem even under a theory of strict liability where the
plaintiff is freed only from proving negligence but not from proving that the defect
existed in the hands of the manufacturer. See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55 (1967), setting forth the following requisites in order to make out a prima
facie case. Plaintiff must establish (1) that the product was in defective condition
when it left the possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause (a substantial factor) of
[Vol. 60:297
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for negligence was faced with the defense that the defendant
had acted reasonably in its manufacturing process. The quality
control sytem of the defendant became the battle ground for
the law suit. If the defendant had in fact acted reasonably the
fact that a defective bottle had slipped through quality control
would not be sufficient grounds for imposing liability. To be
sure the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was of immeasurable as-
sistance to plaintiffs for it permitted an inference of negligence
even in the absence of proof of the specific negligence of the
defendant." Yet, strange as it may seem, the effective use of
the res ipsa doctrine was probably the tipping point for strict
liability. In those instances in which plaintiffs were prevailing
on the basis of res ipsa, even when confronted with a strong
defendant showing of nonnegligence, strict liability was in fact
the doctrine being applied.'5 And in those instances where the
defendant did prevail the fact that plaintiff had been unable
to successfully counter the defendant was attributed to the
defendant's control of the evidence (i.e., the manufacturing
process).'6 Thus, win or lose, there was a strong feeling that
the plaintiff's injury or damages, (4) that the seller engaged in the business of selling
such a product and (5) that the product was one which the seller expected to and did
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition it was when
he sold it.
Thus, even under strict liability, to prove item number (1), that the defect existed
in the hands of the seller, the plaintiff must identify at what point along the distribu-
tive chain the defect came into being. This is not unlike establishing which defendant
was negligent. In certain instances courts have been willing to lighten the plaintiff's
burden on this question. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687
(1945); Nicholas v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa.
212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953). See also James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases
(Including Res Ipsa Loquitor), 37 VA. L. Rav. 179 (1951).
The startling new case on this subject is Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338
A.2d 221 (1975), where the appellate court held that the trial judge must under such
circumstances require a jury to bring a verdict against at least one of the defendants.
A full discussion of the implication of these cases is well beyond the scope of this paper.
14. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1954).
15. See Justice Traynor's now famous dissent in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d at -, 150 P.2d at 441, where this thesis is developed. Justice Traynor
contends:
An injured person, however is not ordinarily in a position to refute such evidence
[of negligence] or identify the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar
with the manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is. In leaving it to
the jury to decide whether the inference has been dispelled, regardless of the
evidence against it, the negligence rule approaches the rule of strict liability. It
is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose
what is in reality liability without negligence.
16. See, e.g., the strong argument for strict liability in Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d




negligence should not be the governing theory.
In a production defect case it is not difficult to identify the
defect in the product. Generally, one need only compare the
product against the "good" product made by the defendant
which rolls off the assembly line. 7 The standard of reference is
internal-it is the manufacturer's own quality standard. If the
defendant's product fails to measure up to that standard it can,
with relative safety, be identified as a defect."5 If that defect
Today as never before the product in the hands of the consumer is often a
most sophisticated and even mysterious article. Not only does it usually emerge
as a sealed unit with an alluring exterior rather than as a visible assembly of
component parts, but its functional validity and usefulness often depend on the
application of electronic, chemical or hydraulic principles far beyond the ken
of the average consumer. Advances in the technologies of materials, of pro-
cesses, of operational means have put it almost entirely out of the reach of the
consumer to comprehend why or how the article operates, and thus even farther
out of his reach to detect when there may be a defect or a danger present in its
design or manufacture. In today's world it is often only the manufacturer who
can fairly be said to know and to understand when an article is suitably designed
and safely made for its intended purpose. Once floated on the market, many
articles in a very real practical sense defy detection of defect, except possibly
in the hands of an expert after laborious and perhaps even destructive disassem-
bly. By way of direct illustration, how many automobile purchasers or users
have any idea how a power steering mechanism operates or is intended to oper-
ate, with its "circulating worm and piston assembly and its cross shaft splined
to the Pitman arm"? Further, as has been noted, in all this the bystander, the
nonuser, is even worse off than the user-to the point of total exclusion from
any opportunity either to choose manufacturers or retailers or to detect defects.
We are accordingly persuaded that from the standpoint of justice as regards the
operating aspect of today's products, responsibility should be laid on the manu-
facturer, subject to the limitations we set forth.
17. See Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manu-
facture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability]. Many of the early strict liability cases were of this
genre. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1960); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Gold-
berg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1963).
18. Theoretically, the statement in the text is overbroad. The test for unreasonable
danger is, in reality, the same for both production and design defect cases. The practi-
cal effect of administering the test may result in a finding that in production defect
cases that the product is unreasonably dangerous in most instances. For example, the
burden of precaution in a production defect case may be for the manufacturer not to
market the flawed product which comes off the assembly line while the burden of
precaution in a design defect case may be to effect a substantial alteration in the entire
design of a product. To be sure, the defendant may not know which of the products of
the assembly line is flawed and thus may not be negligent. But if strict liability focuses
on whether the product is defective, then the question of defendant's ability to know
is irrelevant. Thus a product with a manufacturing defect can be termed defective
since the defendant, if he had the knowledge, would have decided against marketing
[Vol. 60:297
RETHINKING PRODUCTS LIABILITY
caused the plaintiff's harm, a prima facie case has been estab-
lished. Thus, it rarely makes a difference in a production defect
case whether the standard given to the jury for deciding
whether a defect exists is that the product is "defective" or
"unreasonably dangerous" or "defective and unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer." The decisional process
remains the same. The internal manufacturing standard is the
bench mark for assessing the presence of defect.
In a design defect (or failure to warn)19 case the situation is
far different for there is no claim that the unit which caused
injury to the plaintiff is any different from any other unit of the
same model produced by the manufacturer. The claim, in-.
stead, is that an entire model line or a particular feature of an
entire model line is defective. Since there is nothing "wrong"
with the product per se, the term "defective" has no meaning
without reference to some external standard. It is here that the
battle lines are formed.
1. The Defect Test
Several courts have taken the position that there is no in-
trinsic difference between a strict liability case based on defec-
tive design and one based on defective manufacture. If defect
is an acceptable term of art for the one, it is acceptable for the
the flawed product. On the other hand, a design defect case may involve serious
evaluation of risk-utility considerations. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler and Donaher,
Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 425, 433 n.
14 (1974). A problem may arise if the manufacturing standards of a given company
give rise to a flaw which still meets acceptable standards of the entire industry and
which do not fall below risk-utility standards as assessed by the judiciary. In such an
instance, in the absence of express warranty, it would be improper to hold a particular
manufacturer liable for a flaw that is predicated upon a higher standard than that
imposed on the industry as a whole. Thus, for example, an automobile part which is
flawed if judged on Rolls-Royce standards is not necessarily unreasonably dangerous
if such a standard is acceptable when applied to other automobile manufacturers. The
only recourse for the plaintiff who suffered injury due to a failure of a Rolls-Royce part
if it meets general industry standards would be an action for express warranty.
19. Failure-to-warn cases are analogous to design defect cases in that the issue is
whether an entire product line should have been marketed with a warning. The indi-
vidual product which caused the injury is not singled out because it differs from all
others marketed by the manufacturer. See W. PRossEa, LAW OF ToRTs § 96, at 644-47
(4th ed. 1971); Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Taxs L.
REv. 398 (1970). For a full discussion of the interplay between warning and design
parameters, see Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 3.
19771
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other. The judicial statement of this view in Cronin v. J. B. E.
Olson Corp.'" is direct and forthright.
We can see no difficulty in applying the Greenman [strict
liability] formulation to the full range of products liability
situations, including those involving "design defects." A de-
fect may emerge from the mind of a designer as well as from
the hand of the workman.
The most obvious problem we perceive in creating any such
distinction is that thereafter it would be advantageous to
characterize a defect in one rather than the other category.
It is difficult to prove that a product ultimately caused in-
jury because a widget was poorly welded-a defect in manu-
facturer-rather than because it was made of inexpensive
metal difficult to weld, chosen by a designer concerned with
economy-a defect in design. The proof problem would, of
course, be magnified when the article in question was either
old or unique, with no easily available basis for comparison.
We wish to avoid providing such a battleground for clever
counsel. Furthermore, we find no reason why a different stan-
dard, and one harder to meet, should apply to defects which
plague entire product lines. We recognize that it is more dam-
aging to a manufacturer to have an entire line condemned,
so to speak, for a defect in design, than a single product for a
defect in manufacture. But the potential economic loss to a
manufacturer should not be reflected in a different standard
of proof for an injured consumer."
The court concluded that any reference to an external standard
requiring that the product be "unreasonably dangerous"
should not be permitted. When faced with the problem that the
word "defect" had no clearly defined meaning in a design de-
fect case the court passed the problem off in a footnote by
expressing its faith that eventually there would emerge an ac-
ceptable definition of the defect concept." After discussion of
the more successful attempts to define defect we shall reflect
again on the inadequacies of the Cronin formulation. Suffice it
to say that it has established a concept of defect without mean-
ingful content. It may now be true that defect, like obscenity
20. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
21. Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43 (1972) (emphasis
added). See also Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 295 Ala. -, 335 So. 2d 128 (1976).
22. 8 Cal. 3d at 135 n. 16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n. 16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n. 16. A
similar position has been espoused by courts both in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
See note 9 supra.
[Vol. 60:297
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in Justice Stewart's definition, will be discovered by sense im-
pression.23 Unfortunately, "I know it when I see it" will not
suffice as a judicial standard for products liability.
2. The Consumer Expectation Test
A more meaningful standard is found in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which predicates liability upon a finding
that a product is "in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer. 2 -4 The comments to the
Restatement seem to emphasize that the consumer expectation
test is the essence of strict tort liability. A product is considered
defective when "it is. . .in a condition not contemplated by
the ultimate consumer. '25 And a product is to be found unrea-
sonably dangerous when it is "dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases the product, with the ordinary knowledge com-
mon to the community as to its characteristics. '26
In a joint article arising from a National Science Founda-
tion study my colleagues and I sharply attacked the consumer
expectation test as the operative test for strict liability. The
virtue of the consumer expectation test is that it does focus on
the product as a functioning entity in the hands of the con-
sumer and eliminates negligence considerations (which focus
on the conduct of the defendant) from a design defect case. We
then noted:
The Restatement standard is, however, a mixed blessing. Al-
though it forces an examination of the actual environment of
product use, it suffers from the fact that this examination is
undertaken from the viewpoint of the ordinary consumer.
The test suggests that if the ordinary consumer "contem-
plates" the danger, then the product is not unreasonably dan-
gerous. Indeed, there is a strong argument that the
Restatement language is but an updated version of the patent
danger rule. This rule, which has come under heavy attack
from both academic and judicial quarters, provides that a
manufacturer has fulfilled all his duties to the consumer if
23. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). See
Donaher, Piehler, Twerski, and Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products
Liability Litigation, 52 TEXAs L. REv. 1303 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Donaher].
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
25. Id. comment g.
26. Id. comment i.
1977]
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the product's dangers are open and obvious. In many instan-
ces manufacturers have been absolved from liability when an
obvious danger caused serious injury, even though that injury
could have been averted by a design modification that would
not have added significantly to the cost of the product or
impaired its usefulness. For courts seeking to rid themselves
of every vestige of the patent danger rule, the adoption of the
§ 402A comments was fraught with risks. The language could
too easily be misunderstood.?
Subsequent developments have proven that our prophecies
of doom were well founded. In Vincer v. Esther Williams All-
Aluminum Swimming Pool Co.,2" the Wisconsin court illus-
trated that plaintiffs have good reason to fear a test which
establishes liability solely on the basis of consumer expecta-
tions. In that case plaintiff, a two-year-old child, suffered in-
jury when he fell into a swimming pool in the backyard of the
home of his grandfather, whom he was visiting. The complaint
alleged that a retractable ladder to the above-ground pool had
been left in the down position, that the pool was unsupervised
and that the plaintiff climbed the ladder, fell into the water
and remained there for an extended period of time, resulting
in severe brain damage. The plaintiff contended that the swim-
ming pool was defectively designed because the defendant had
failed to take the reasonable and low cost precaution of build-
ing the swimming pool so that the fencing extended across the
deck at the top of the ladder opening, with a self-closing, self-
latching gate on the deck of the swimming pool. This suggested
design would have prevented access to the swimming pool area
by children of the plaintiff's tender age even when the ladder
from the deck to the ground was in the down position.
The Wisconsin court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint
holding that, as a matter of law, the swimming pool was not
defectively designed. Its reason for so holding was that the
Restatement-consumer expectation test demanded such a
result. The court said:
[T]he test in Wisconsin of whether a product contains an
unreasonably dangerous defect depends upon the reasonable
expectations of the ordinary consumer concerning the charac-
teristics of this type of product. If the average consumer
27. Donaher, supra note 23 at 1304.
28. 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
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would reasonably anticipate the dangerous condition of the
product and fully appreciate the attendant risk of injury, it
would not be unreasonably dangerous and defective. This is
an objective test and is not dependent upon the knowledge
of the particular injured consumer.
Based upon the principles discussed above, we conclude that
the swimming pool described in plaintiff's complaint does not
contain an unreasonably dangerous defect. The lack of a self-
latching gate certainly falls within the category of an obvious
rather than a latent condition.9
It is strange that after the rejection of the patent danger rule
by the most respected courts in the country " and after its dis-
creditation by leading academic critics3' that the doctrine has
received new acceptance 32 clothed in the respectable language
of the Restatement. Indeed the fountainhead of the patent
danger rule, the New York Court of Appeals, has recently seen
fit to reject the doctrine outright. The rule that a manufacturer
was not responsible for dangers in a product which were open
and obvious had its origin in the landmark case of Campo v.
Scofield.33 In that case plaintiff was engaged in feeding onions
into an "onion topping" machine when his hands became
caught in its revolving steel rollers and were badly injured.
Plaintiff alleged that the onion topping machine was negli-
29. Id. at 332-33, 230 N.W.2d at 799 (emphasis added).
30. Orfield v. International Harvester, 535 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1976); Dorsey v. Yoder
Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd sub. nom. Yoder Co. v. General Copper &
Brass Co., 474 F.2d 1339 (3rd Cir. 1973); Byrns v. Riddell Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550
P.2d 1065 (1976); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 2d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (1970); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115 (1976); Casey v. Gifford Wood Co., 61 Mich. App. 208, 232 N.W.2d 360 (1975);
Coger v. Mackinaw Products Co., 48 Mich. App. 113, 210 N.W.2d 124 (1973); Byrnes
v. Economic Mach. Co., 41 Mich. App. 192, 200 N.W.2d 104 (1972); Palmer v. Massey
Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970).
31. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.5 (1956); Marschall, An
Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers'Liability for Patently Danger-
ous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065 (1973); Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy%
of Information, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 398 (1970); Twerski, Old Wine in a New
Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L.
REV. 1 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask!.
32. In addition to the Vincer case in Wisconsin, the following courts have, by their
adoption of section 402A, comment i, given tacit approval to the patent danger doc-
trine: Sherrill v. Royal Industries, Inc., 526 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1975); Hartman v. Miller
Hydro Co., 499 F.2d 191 (10th Cir. 1974).
33. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
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gently designed because the manufacturer had failed to provide
safety guards that would prevent the user from getting his
hands caught in the machine. The court held that no liability
would attach:
The cases establish that the manufacturer of a machine or
any other article, dangerous because of the way in which it
functions, and patently so, owes to those who use it a duty
merely to make it free from latent defects and concealed dan-
gers. Accordingly, if a remote user sues a manufacturer of an
article for injuries suffered, he must allege and prove the
existence of a latent defect or a danger not known to the
plaintiff or other users.3"
After a long and disappointing relationship with the patent
danger rule'  the New York Court of Appeals rejected the doc-
trine in Micallef v. Miehle Co. " Plaintiff, Paul Micallef was
employed as an operator on a huge photo-offset printing press.
One day while working on the press plaintiff discovered that a
foreign object had made its way onto the plate of the unit. Such
a substance, known to the printing trade as a "hickie," causes
a blemish or imperfection on the printing page. In order to
correct this situation plaintiff informed his superior that it was
his intention to "chase the hickie." The process of "chasing
hickies" consists of applying, very lightly, a piece of plastic
about eight inches wide to the printing plate, which is wrapped
around a circular plate cylinder that spins at high speed. The
revolving action of the plate against the plastic removes the
"hickie." While plaintiff was engaged in this maneuver the
plastic was drawn into the nip point grabbing his hand between
the plate cylinder and an ink-form roller. The photo-offset
34. Id. at 471, 95 N.E.2d at 803 (emphasis added).
35. See Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957); Meyer v. Gehl Co., 36 N.Y.2d 760, 761, 329 N.E.2d 666, 368
N.Y.S.2d 834 (1975) in which a biting dissenting opinion by Justice Fuchsberg appears.
In that case the patent danger rule barred recovery to a five-year-old plaintiff who got
his hand caught in the exposed gears of a hay unloading machine. The plaintiff, to no
avail, argued that what was patent to an adult might be latent to a child; and further,
that plaintiff should not be barred from establishing the hay unloading machine could
have been made reasonably safe for only a slight additional-cost. See Brief of Appellant
pp. 9-13. Thus, plaintiff sought the privilege of establishing his case using risk-utility
principles. This was identical to the quest of the plaintiff in Vincer v. Esther Williams
All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
36. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.d 115 (1976).
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machine had no safety guards to prevent such an occurrence
and plaintiff was unable to quickly stop the machine because
the shut-off button was distant from the point of operation of
the machine.
The plaintiff, Micallef, was fully aware of the danger of
getting his hand caught in the press while "chasing hickies."
It was, however, the custom of the industry to "chase hickies
oi the run," because once the machine was stopped, it required
at least three hours to resume printing. An expert witness testi-
fied that good engineering practice would dictate that a safety
guard be placed near the rollers since the danger of human
contact at the point of operation was well known. The court
realized that even though this design modification was both
reasonable and feasible, the Campo-patent danger rule de-
manded that recovery be denied. In rejecting its long held posi-
tion that the obviousness of the danger is to be the only crite-
rion for judging the safety of a product the court relied on the
astute observations of Professors Harper and James. They con-
tend:
[Tihe bottom does not logically drop out of a negligence case
against the maker when it is shown that the purchaser knew
of the dangerous condition. Thus if the product is a carrot-
topping machine with exposed moving parts, or an electric
clothes wringer dangerous to the limbs of the operator, and
if it would be feasible for the maker of the product to install
a guard or safety release, it should be a question for the jury
whether reasonable care demanded such a precaution,
though its absence is obvious. Surely reasonable men might
find here a great danger, even to one who knew the condition;
and since it was so readily avoidable they might find the
maker negligent.37
Returning to the Vincer v. Esther Williams swimming pool
case it is clear that by adopting the patent danger rule the
Wisconsin court short-circuited the analytical process. The
court removed from both the court's and jury's consideration
an examination of the safety of the design of the swimming
pool. If, for example, for a very slight additional cost it would
be possible to virtually eliminate the danger of accidental
37. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.5 at 1543 (1966). For a further
expansion of this thesis see James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation. 78
YALE L.J. 185 (1968); Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask, supra note 31.
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drownings then such a design modification should be given
serious consideration through the medium of a design defect
case. 
s
At this stage of the discussion, I am forced to confess error.
In my earlier writings on this subject I joined Harper and
James in the analytical framework they had suggested for deal-
ing with the open danger problem. 9 The argument proceeds
along the following lines: The mere fact that a court abolishes
the patent danger rule does not necessarily mean that the ob-
viousness of the danger is irrelevant to the determination of
whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous." Since the con-
cept of reasonable danger depends on a consideration of risk-
utility principles it must be recognized that the obviousness of
the danger often reduces the frequency of risk exposure. The
38. The late Chief Justice Wilke, in his dissent, argued that the jury should not be
deprived of the opportunity of evaluating the case on risk-utility principles. He was
unprepared to permit the case to be short-circuited by an inflexible no-duty rule.
Justice Wilke's position is consistent with that offered in the text. Unfortunately,
neither the majority nor the dissent allerted the court to the fact that in both Vincer
and Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975), the court was adopt-
ing the ill-fated patent danger rule.
Justice Wilke then argued that the plaintiff's ability to appreciate the danger
should not be a factor in deciding whether the product is unreasonably dangerous, but
should rather become a matter of affirmative defense. Realizing that in the context of
Vincer this would mean that defendant would bear the entire loss because the plaintiff
was two years old and could thus not be deemed contributorily negligent, Justice Wilke
made the astounding suggestion that the parents' negligence be imputed to the infant.
As indicated in the text, the abolition of the patent danger rule does not mean that
the obviousness of the danger is not an important fact in determining whether the
product is unreasonably dangerous. It becomes part of the risk-utility calculus. Thus,
if the Wisconsin court had been so inclined, it could have decided that it would not
pay allegiance to the patent danger rule, but still find as a matter of law that the
swimming pool was not unreasonably dangerous. Only by deciding that the product is
unreasonably dangerous by use of risk-utility criterion, should the court face the ques-
tion of plaintiff's contributory negligence. Thus, in this case if the jury had indeed
found that the swimming pool should have been constructed to protect children from
accidental drowning, and that it was in fact unreasonably dangerous, it would have
been ludicrous to permit contributory negligence to defeat or diminish plaintiff's recov-
ery. See text accompanying footnotes 105 to 114.
This penchant for missing the crucial middle step, and thus moving from the
abolition of the patent danger rule to the position that the obviousness of the danger
is only to affect the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
the risk was recently demonstrated by the New York Court of Appeals in Micallef v.
Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976), in which the court appeared to
take the position that the obviousness of the danger will go only to the affirmative
defense. Id. at 387, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
39. Twerski, From Colding to Bolm to Velez, A Tryptych of Confusion, 2 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 489 (1974); Donaher, supra note 23.
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more obvious the risk, the less chance there is that people will
encounter it. Thus, by including the obviousness of the risk
into overall risk-utility considerations it may well be that a
product will be considered reasonably safe. This may especially
be true if the cost of eliminating the hazard is high or if the
utility of a product can be seriously impaired by a design modi-
fication. Under this analysis, consumer expectations become a
part (albeit only a part) of the overall determination of whether
a product is or is not "unreasonably dangerous."4 In instances
where the risk-utility analysis as a result of the obviousness of
the danger is so clear that reasonable men cannot differ a court
may still, on a case by case basis, direct a verdict for the defen-
dant. Where the issue is less clear the issue would be for the
jury. The virtue of this approach is that instead of a categorical
determination that all patent danger cases are to be dismissed
a court can decide when the balancing of risk-utility considera-
tions demands that a verdict be given for defendant. This per-
mits the judge to consider in his overall assessment the
probability of the risk, the gravity of the harm and the burden
or costs of preventing the obvious danger which is under attack.
The overall good sense of this "consider the obviousness
together with everything else" approach has caused some
courts to reject the "consumer expectation" test." And yet, we
40. Authorities cited supra note 39; Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Yoder v. General Copper & Brass Co., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir.
1973); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976).
41. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974). In Roach the court
begins its analysis of a design defect case by citing Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore.
467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967). Heaton is discussed in the text accompanying footnotes 45
to 47. The court in Roach characterizes its own decision in Heaton as adopting the
consumer expectation test. The court then goes on to adopt a risk-utility test for design
defect cases eliminating scienter as a requirement of plaintiffs' prima facie case. It is
not clear whether in adopting the risk-utility formulation the court abandoned the
consumer expectation test. There is some evidence that the court has confused the
two tests. In discussing the court's view that strict liability is negligence absent scien-
ter the court states:
As Professor Wade points out, a way of determining whether the condition of
the article is of the requisite degree of dangerousness to be defective
(unreasonably dangerous; greater degree of danger than a consumer has a right
to expect; not duly safe) is to assume that the manufacturer knew of the prod-
uct's propensity to injure as it did, and then to ask whether, with such knowl-
edge, something should have been done about the danger before it was sold.
525 P.2d at 129. The italicized portion of the above quote indicates considerable
confusion as to whether the operative test for liability is the consumer expectation test
19771
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
find a dogged determination on the part of other courts to focus
on that test as the operative rule for products liability determi-
nation." I suggest that there is a good bit of right on both sides
and that a fundamental restructuring of the order in which
these tests are presented to a court or jury for determination
will indicate that both tests can and should be utilized in as-
sessing liability in a products liability case.
Courts and commentators have perceived that there really
are two separate questions in any products liability action:
(1) Does the product meet consumer expectations and
(2) Does the product meet the standards of safety which so-
ciety demands from products by evaluating risk-utility consid-
erations? The shortcoming of the consumer expecation test is
not that it is irrelevant; it is that it is not ambitious enough. A
product may well meet consumer expecations when-the danger
is obvious and/or well warned against. Nevertheless, the judg-
ment of society may be that for a slight additional cost (in some
instances at no cost) design modifications could eliminate ob-
vious dangers which are both substantial and hazardous. This
would then seem to force us back into a general risk-utility
evaluation of the product. On the other hand, there seems to
be a strongly held opinion that plaintiffs should not be forced,
in a strict liability action, to make out a risk-utility case when
the product has failed to meet the common expectations of
society for product performance. 3
The answer to this dilemma is that a two-tiered test should
be utilized. The consumer expectation test is an excellent
standard below which no product should be permitted to fall."
or one based on risk-utility considerations. As pointed out in the text infra the two tests
are not synonymous. In previous decisions Oregon had cast its lot with the consumer
expectation test. Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973). See
also Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 489, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974), where the risk-
utility test seems to prevail. For a reconciliation of these two tests see text accompany-
ing notes 44-48 infra.
42. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d
401 (1969); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973); Vincer v.
Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794
(1975).
43. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 2d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
4:33 (1972), and authorities cited supra note 42.
44. A full development of representational theory can be found in the brilliant
analysis of the problem by Professor Marshall Shapo in his article entitled A Represen-
tational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability
for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109-1388 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
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Shapo]. In Professor Shapo's own words, his thesis is that:
Judgments of liability for consumer product disappointment should center ini-
tially and principally on the portrayal of the product which is made, caused to
be made or permitted by the seller. This portrayal should be viewed in the
context of the impression reasonably received by the consumer from representa-
tions or other communications made to him about the product by various
means: through advertising, by the appearance of the product, and by the other
ways in which the product projects an image on the mind of the consumer,
including impressions created by widespread social agreement about the prod-
uct's function. This judgment should take into consideration the result objec-
tively determinable to have been sought by the seller, and the seller's apparent
motivation in making or permitting the representation or communication.
These determinations of liability should consider, gererally, the integrated
image of the product against the background of the public communications that
relate to it; and should refer, specifically, to those communications concerning
the characteristics or features of the product principally related to the element
of disappointment, and to the question of whether these characteristics or fea-
tures reasonably might have aroused conflict with respect to the decision to buy
or otherwise to encounter'the product.
Id. at 1370.
It would not be appropriate to deal with a fully developed and masterful 270-page
thesis within the context of a footnote. One must read the article in its entirety to
appreciate the almost majestic scope of the theory presented and the very impressive
array of authority which is brought in support of Professor Shapo's representational
theory. There are many areas of convergence between the Shapo thesis and my own.
See Twerski, Cases On Products Liability (1974) (on file in Hofstra University Law
Library) and Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask, supra note 31. Nevertheless, I find
myself in significant disagreement with the broad sweep of the Shapo thesis. It appears
that Shapo believes that risk-utility considerations would be merged into a representa-
tional model. See Shapo supra at 1370. At various points in the development of his
thesis, he strains to resolve problems such as those raised by industrial machinery, the
patent-latent danger problem and the bystander problem into his representational
model. Shapo, at various points in his article, recoils from defining his representational
theory as the exclusive method for resolving products problems. Nevertheless, he feels
compelled to work out problems which, in this author's view, are best analyzed under
risk-utility principles within his representational model.
This author has some explaining to do in fashioning the two-tiered test for defect.
In an earlier article written in conjunction with my colleagues for a National Science
Foundation Study, we argued that there is a sensitive interplay between design and
warning (representational) parameters. Since the amount of information a consumer
can carry as part of his mental baggage is limited, it is necessary to decide which
dangers are to be designed out of the product and which are to be warned against. See
Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 3.
The present suggestion is that if a product fails to meet consumer expectations it
will be held to be defective. If our previous thesis was correct, then even warnings
(representations) must be judged in a risk-utility framework. The answer to this pre-
dicament is made of the same cloth as this author's objection to the sweeping nature
of the Shapo thesis. Shapo would include into representational theory all the subtle-
ties that affect consumer expectations. Although there is much to be said for straight-
forward representational approach, I believe that, in order for the representation
theory to be workable and understandable by a jury, it must be at a fairly gross level
if we are to declare the product defective because it disappoints consumer expecta-
tions. The fine tuning of the representational theory, in which the jury is permitted to
assess the subtleties of the product, belongs in the overall visceral reaction which a
jury brings to bear in its overall risk analysis. I would thus limit the representational
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If plaintiff establishes that realistic consumer expectations
with regard to the product have not been met then the product
is defective-without further considering risk-utility princi-
ples. If society's views, as gauged through the eyes of the aver-
age consumer, are unrealistic then it is the function of the
marketing system to bring them back into line. To hold a man-
ufacturer to a standard which reflects normal expectations
appears eminently fair. Thus, a plaintiff should be free to make
out a case of defect based on the failure of the product to meet
consumer expectations. If the finder of fact determines that the
product has failed the consumer expectation test, a defect has
been established. If that defect was causal of the plaintiff's
harm a prima facie case has been established.
The converse, however, is not true. A finding that the defen-
dant has met the consumer expectation test will not necessarily
absolve him of liability. It may still be possible that utilizing
the second-tier test, that of "unreasonable risk" based on risk-
utility considerations, a court may find that a product which
meets consumer expectations as to what the product is does not
meet society's expectations as to what the product should be.
To be sure, we ought not be prepared to go off the deep end and
impose liability cavalierly on products that conform with con-
sumer expectations. 5 But, the underlying question is whether
society will, through its judicial system, ever demand more
than an honest product and will require a safe product as well.
Although honesty and safety in a product often coincide, they
are not matching ends of a bookcase. The safety standard may
be more demanding than the honesty standard. The cases over-
ruling the patent danger rule can be read in no other way.
An interesting example of the application of the two-tiered
test can be found in a much cited Oregon case, Heaton v. Ford
Motor Co."5 In that case plaintiff had purchased a new truck
problem to clearly disappointed expectations and deal with the design-warning inter-
play within the context of the unreasonable danger problem in which the jury is faced
with design and warning alternatives. See also Green, Strict Liability Under Sections
402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEXAS L. REv. 1185 (1976).
45. It should be noted that the patent danger rule did not survive for a quarter of
a century on totally irrational grounds. Whenever we are faced with a patent danger
situation, we should be aware that we are entering into an area in which the consumer's
right to make a knowing choice may be affected, and that we are about to act in a
paternalistic fashion. But see Keeton, Products Liability, supra note 19. Professor
Shapo suggests that even in patent danger cases there may be lurking representational
problems. See Shapo, supra note 44, at 1210-11 and 1351.
46. 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967).
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to use for hunting and other cross-country purposes. He had
driven the truck some seven thousand miles without noticing
anything unusual about its performance. On the day of the
accident, however, the truck while moving on a "black-top"
highway at normal speed, hit a rock which plaintiff described
as about five or six inches in diameter. The truck continued on
uneventfully for approximately thirty-five miles, when it left
the road and tipped over. The court held that the evidence
presented in the case did not permit a finding that the defen-
dant had breached the "consumer expectation" standard.
Where the performance failure occurs under conditions with
which the average consumer has experience, the facts of the
accident alone may constitute a sufficient basis for the jury
to decide whether the expectations of an ordinary consumer
of the product were met. High speed collisions with large
rocks are not so common, however, that the average person
would know from personal experience what to expect under
the circumstances. . . . The jury would therefore be une-
quipped, either by general background or by facts supplied
in the record, to decide whether this wheel failed to perform
as safely as an ordinary consumer would have expected.47
The court then considered whether the jury should have
been permitted to decide how strong the product should be.
The court recognized that in order for a jury to attempt this
kind of evaluation it would have to be presented with the kind
of data necessary to make a risk-utility evaluation. The court
stated:
Such an opinion by the jury would be formed [in this case]
without the benefit of data concerning the cost or feasibility
of designing and building stronger products. Without refer-
ence to relevant factual data, the jury has no special qualifi-
cations for deciding what is reasonable.48
Given the suggested analytical framework for deciding the
defect issue in a products case it is not necessary for courts to
choose between the "consumer expectation" test and the "un-
reasonably dangerous" standard. A products case would be
47. Id. at 474, 435 P.2d at 809.
48. Id. It may be that Justice O'Connell had the better of the argument in this case
when, in his dissenting opinion, he argued that a jury could find that this product did
in fact not meet consumer expectations. But, that does not at all detract from the
wisdom of the two-tiered approach. This may have been a case which was resolvable
on the basis of clear disappointment of consumer expectation.
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submitted to the jury to determine first, whether the product
met with average consumer expectations; if the answer is nega-
tive, defect is established. If the answer is in the affirmative
then plaintiff bears the burden to establish, by utilizing rele-
vant risk-utility criteria, that the product does not meet socie-
tal standards of safety4. ' Having established a two-step stan-
dard for determining defect a further explication of what risk-
utility balancing means in the context of a strict liability case
is in order.
3. The Unreasonably Dangerous Product- Risk- Utility
Balancing
The distinction between negligence and strict products lia-
bility, as pointed out earlier, is that negligence focuses on the
conduct of the defendant and strict liability focuses directly on
the product in the environment of its use. Since there is general
agreement that the manufacturer is not the insurer of the prod-
uct but is liable only when a product is defective," it becomes
clear that some external standard must be used in order to give
content to the defect concept in a design defect case. The sec-
ond step of the two-tiered test suggested above requires that a
plaintiff establish that a product is "unreasonably dangerous."
Since a product is a thing rather than a person the term "un-
reasonably dangerous" needs some explanation. Products are
not capable of reasoning-only persons are. What we mean
when we speak of the "unreasonably dangerous" product is
that we recognize that all products present risks to the consum-
ing public. Some risks, when balanced against the important
functions that the product performs and the cost of providing
for greater safety, are deemed "reasonable." This means that
a reasonable person who had actual knowledge of the product's
harmful character would conclude that it was proper to market
the product in that condition.'"
How does this differ from negligence? In products liability,
48.1. See Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of
Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 843-44 (1976).
49. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 21, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 509
P.2d 529 (1973); Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
50. See Keeton, Product Liability, supra note 19; Keeton, Manufacturer's Liabil-
ity, supra note 17; Atkins v. American Motors, Inc., 295 Ala. -, 335 So. 2d 134
(1976); Harding v. Kimwood Corp., Or. -, 551 P.2d 107 (1976); Roach v.
Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974).
[Vol. 60:297
RETHINKING PRODUCTS LIABILITY
unlike negligence, we do not concern ourselves with the con-
duct of the defendant which brought about the unreasonably
dangerous condition. Thus, for example, if in the testing of a
product the defendant manufacturer has acted reasonably and
has performed adequate testing and after the product is in
actual use in the marketplace it then turns out that the testing
and design process failed to account for certain dangers and the
design is deemed inadequate it will not be a defense that the
defendant acted reasonably. If we can proclaim that the prod-
uct is in fact not reasonably safe-in that a reasonable person
who had that knowledge would have decided against marketing
without the design alteration or additional warning-then the
product is unreasonably dangerous. 5'
It must be understood that applying a strict liability ration-
ale to a design defect case is a fairly radical idea. What, in fact,
happens is that the defendant is held accountable for knowl-
edge and technology that may not have been available at the
time the product was manufactured. In certain areas of product
liability law where the interests of society are particularly high
in assuring product availability, the courts have refused to
adopt strict liability. Thus, the vast majority of drug cases
continue to follow the negligence theory.52 The Restatement
51. Authorities cited supra note 50.
52. The text lumps together for discussion what the cognescenti of product liability
law know to be rather different kinds of problems. In the standard strict liability case,
it is rare for the defendant to contend that it was beyond the capability of technology
to discover the defect or to test against a certain aspect of faulty design. If the product
is, in fact, defective the plaintiff can clearly recover. He is freed from having to prove
negligence and can prevail on proof of defect alone. Yet, if strict liability means that
negligence is not relevant, then the plaintiff should be able to prevail even when the
defendant can establish that he was not negligent. See Keeton, Products Liability,
supra note 19. As theoretically sound as this argument is, it has not carried the day in
the drug cases. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Cochran v.
Brooke, 243 Or. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966). And though there are cases holding that the
state of the art is not a defense, Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d
443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970), there are cases which hold that a court will not hold a
manufacturer to a standard which was not part of the safety ethic at the time the
product was manufactured. Ward v. Hobart, 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971). See Shapo,
supra note 44, at 1356-61; Byrne, Strict Liability and the Scientifically Unknowable
Risk, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 660 (1974). Thus, in essence, there is evidence that strict
liability may be less a rule of liability than an aid to the plaintiff in proving his prima
facie case. Where defendant is truly able to establish that he was not negligent, per-
haps liability will not attach. For all the criticsm that this author heaps on the Wiscon-
sin court for its decision in Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219
N.W.2d 393 (1974), it may be that its view (that strict liability shifts the burden of
proof) remains essentially correct in those cases in which the defendant contends that
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(Second) of Torts, section 402A, comment k eschewed the ap-
plication of strict liability for new and experimental drugs.
There is a lively debate still waging between the commentators
and the courts as to whether design defect cases are really to
be handled under strict liability guidelines.13 My own observa-
tions are that even those courts that are willing to apply strict
liability theory in design defect cases have yet to face the tough
issue-what is to be done when the defendant claims and is
able to establish that with the use of due care he was unable
to discover the problem or, had he discovered it, would under
the then available technology have been unable to solve it. The
willingness of courts to apply strict liability when the facts of
the case indicate that negligence could have been established
demands a note of caution as to the scope and breadth of strict
liability law.
Nonetheless, courts have held that the state of the art is not
a defense to a strict liability case. 4 The Oregon Supreme Court
has given clear expression to the strict liability doctrine in
design defect cases. In Roach v. Kononen they said:
[I]t is generally recognized that the basic difference between
negligence on the one hand and strict liability for a design
defect on the other, is that in strict liability we are talking
about the condition (dangerousness) of an article which is
designed in a particular way, while in negligence we are talk-
ing about the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions in
designing and selling the article as he did. The article can
have a degree of dangerousness which the law of strict liabil-
ity will not tolerate even though the actions of the designer
were entirely reasonable in view of what he knew at the time
he planned and sold the manufactured product. As Professor
there was no means possible for defendant to prevent the defect had he acted reasona-
bly under the circumstances. See text accompanying notes 62 to 84 infra for a full
discussion of Powers.
53. See Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Boret
v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Balido v. Improved
Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973); Thompson v. Package
Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 99 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972); Roach v. Konenen, 269 Or.
457 525 P.2d 125 (1974); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §94, at 644-48 (4th ed. 1971);
Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw.
U.L. Rav. 109 (1976).
54. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812 (1974); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d




Wade points out, a way of determining whether the condition
of the article is of the requisite degree of dangerousness to be
defective (unreasonably dangerous) . . . is to assume that
the manufacturer knew of the product's propensity to injure
as it did, and then to ask whether, with such knowledge,
something should have been done about the danger before the
product was sold. 5
4. The Tail Wags the Dog: Negligence Per Se-The Strange
Wisconsin Doctrine
Among the states that have adopted strict liability Wiscon-
sin stands in the minority in its peculiar reading of the strict
liability doctrine. When Wisconsin first adopted strict liability
in Dippel v. Sciano56 the court sought to analogize the new
doctrine to the already familiar doctrine of negligence per se.
One can readily see the alluring nature of the analogy. Negli-
gence per se permits a court to adopt a criminal statute or to
effect a court made rule as to the minimum standard of care. 57
Once it is adopted by the court the question is no longer what
the standard of conduct for the defendant shall be; it is not
permissible for the defendant to claim that he had acted rea-
sonably under the circumstances. If the defendant's conduct
comes within the purview of the statute or the court adopted
standard of conduct, he is negligent. The case will not be given
to the jury except to decide whether or not the per se rule was
violated. The standard of care remains inviolate and beyond
question. Similarly, if the product is defective, the defendant,
by selling the product, is deemed to be negligent per se and will
not be heard to say that he acted reasonably.
The consequences for Wisconsin jurisprudence in adopting
the negligence per se rule have been extreme. The analogy is
not apt and was destined to play havoc with the reasonable
development of product liability law. And although there has
recently been some clarification, the court is apparently deter-
mined to define strict liability in negligence per se terminol-
ogy."8 When a court declares that a certain standard of conduct
55. Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974) (emphasis added).
56. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
57. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971); Morris, The Role of Criminal
Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COL. L. REv. 21 (1949) reprinted in C. MoRRIs,
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1952).
58. Thus, even in the more recent opinions when the court states that strict liability
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is negligent per se it is not abolishing reasonableness as the
governing standard of conduct. It merely declares that for rea-
sons of policy the defendant is expected to meet either the
statutory or court made standard-which is now deemed to be
the minimum standard of conduct. If we wish to know how a
reasonable person under the circumstances is to act, the per se
rule tells us what is reasonable. This is not a play on words but
rather a recognition that in the allocation of the proper func-
tion between judge and jury in a negligence case there remains
a class of cases for which the court has the responsibility to set
the minimum standard of conduct.5" Thus when it becomes
really means strict liability and not merely the shifting of the burden of proof on the
negligence issue, the court remains committed to the negligence per se analogy. See
Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976); Greiten v. La Dow, 70
Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975). Several recent decisions have adopted strict
liability using the negligence per se parlance. Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 295
Ala. -, 335 So. 2d 134 (1976); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla.
1976). The negligence per se analogy was a matter of considerable importance to the
Alabama court in adopting strict liability. It immediately was the cause of considera-
ble confusion. The court has apparently contradicted itself as to whether this form of
strict liability will subject a retailer to liability without fault. In the Atkins case the
court says that liability will not attach. However, in a case decided the same day,
Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 295 Ala. -, 335 So. 2d 128 (1976), the court apparently
extends strict liability to suppliers and sellers.
59. See authorities cited supra note 57. It is important to note that the Wisconsin
court's position in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), and Howes
v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972), that foreseeability plays no role in
a negligence per se case does not mean that a per se case is not based on basic
negligence principles. The confusion appears to stem from the now famous quotation
of the court in Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 240 N.W. 372 (1931), in which
the court said:
We come now to a consideration of that class of cases where foreseeability is
not an element of negligence-a more accurate statement would be to that class
of cases where the defendant is foreclosed or concluded upon the question of
foreseeability. In all those cases where it is said that the performance of the
wrongful act being admitted the defendant is guilty of negligence as a matter
of law or that the act is negligent per se, the case is one which admits of no
question as to reasonable anticipation or foreseeability. These cases are those
in the main where the act amounts to a violation of a standard of care fixed by
statute (ordinance) or previous decision. The employment of a minor child in
violation of the statute is an instance of the first kind, and the failure to stop,
look, and listen is the most common illustration of the second type. It is appar-
ent that there must always be a causal relation between the act complained of
and the injury sustained; otherwise liability does not follow.
Id. at 240, 234 N.W. at 378-79 (footnote omitted).
This statement does not mean that foreseeability is not relevant in a negligence per se
case. It only means that foreseeability has already been accounted for in the establish-
ment of the statutory standard and will not be re-examined in the individual case at
bar. It is thus encumbent on the judge to direct a verdict on the standard of care issue
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clear that it would be impossible for the defendant to have met
the statutory standard there exists a defense of excused viola-
tion in a per se case." More important, however, is the simple
fact that a per se rule addresses itself to the question of how
the defendant should act. He must be able to meet the stan-
dard by conforming his actions to the rule of law. Thus, it is
not negligence per se for a retailer to sell a product with a
microscopic metallurgical defect. To say that selling a defec-
tive product is negligence per se is nonsense when there is no
way that the defendant will be able to meet the standard.
Negligence per se is a sensible doctrine because it reflects a
standard of care to which a defendant, if he gives heed, can
conform his conduct. When the courts demand perfection from
a defendant, strict liability is being imposed and any attempt
to label it negligence per se is sophistry.'
Following Dippel v. Sciano there remained substantial
doubt as to whether the negligence per se analogy in Wisconsin
was merely an effort to cast new doctrine in more familiar
language or whether the court truly meant that the governing
rule in products liability was in reality negligence per se. What-
ever doubt that remained seemed to be washed away in Powers
v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.62 Powers was a rather standard
production defect case in which plaintiff was injured when a
ketchup bottle broke while he was gently tapping the bottom
of the bottle to loosen the tight cap. In this decision the late
Chief Justice Hallows, writing for the majority, expanded on
a theme which he had mentioned in his concurring opinion to
since it has already been decided that a reasonable person should have foreseen the
risk and acted to prevent its occurrence.
60. Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 445 P.2d 513, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1968);
Ainsworth v. Deutschman, 251 Or. 596, 446 P.2d 187 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 288A (1965).
61. It appears that even Professor Wade has been lulled into this false analogy. See
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, supra note 18, at 14, wherein he draws
the analogy to the adulterated food cases, such as Doherty v. S.S. Kresge Co., 227 Wis.
661, 278 N.W. 437 (1938). Those cases are in truth not negligence per se cases since
there is no way that defendant can defend on the basis of excused violation. Those
cases are, in fact, the original strict liability cases. Indeed, Professor Wade acknowl-
edges this in his casebook, W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIAL
ON TORTS 246 n. 4 (6th ed. 1976). What leads Professor Wade to draw the negligence
per se analogy in his much cited article remains a mystery to this author. The erro-
neous analogy was relied on in Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 295 Ala. -, 335
So. 2d 134 (1976).
62. 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974).
63. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 463-64, 155 N.W.2d 55, 65-66 (1967).
19771
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Dippel.63 Concerned that strict liability might be misconstrued
as absolute liability he took pains to assure the bar that this
was not so in Wisconsin.
Absolute liability is imposed for public policy reasons and
admits of no exceptions or defenses. Strict liability in this
state at least means negligence as a matter of law or negli-
gence per se, and the effect of the adoption of the rule of strict
liability based on this negligence in effect shifts the burden
of proof from the plaintiff of proving specific acts of negli-
gence to the defendant to prove he was not negligent in any
respect. In this respect, the rule in Wisconsin impliedly quali-
fies the Restatement of Torts 2d in Sec. 402A, which states
the rule of sub. (1) "applies although (a) the seller has exer-
cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct." One must read this section as meaning the Restatement
rule in sec. 402A(1) is the starting point and is prima facie
liability based on negligence but does not foreclose the defen-
dant from proving he was not negligent. 4
The rather unequivocal statement has now been cast aside
in Greiten v. La Dow 5 where the court in a meaningful footnote
held that strict liability indeed means strict liability-not
negligence. The court has reiterated this position in Howes v.
Deere & Co."6
The reasons for moving to a clear straightforward adoption
of strict liability are many. First, it will be recalled that one of
the major reasons Wisconsin adopted strict liability in Dippel
was to remove the nefarious discrimination against nonprivity
plaintiffs. 7 Prior to the adoption of strict liability in tort a
plaintiff had a cause of action for breach of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability under the Uniform Commercial
Code." The warranty action was, however, conditioned on a
plaintiff's fulfilling the Code requirements regarding privity,
notice and disclaimers. The essence of the tort action was to
strip the defendant of these defenses. 9 If, however, the essence
64. 64 Wis. 2d at 536, 219 N.W.2d at 395.
65. 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975). For those mystified by the fact that
the concurring opinion is written by four members of the court and the majority by
three members, the court clarified this matter in Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 268,
238 N.W.2d 76 (1976). In fact, the court tells us that the majority in Greiten is really
the concurring opinion and the concurring opinion is really the majority. For those
looking for case authority that four is more than three, Howes v. Deere & Co. clearly
stands for that proposition.
66. 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
67. 37 Wis. 2d at 449-60, 155 N.W.2d at 57-63.
68. U.C.C. § 2-314.
69. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962), Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); RESTATE-
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of the tort action is negligence with a mere shift in the burden
of proof to the defendant, a cause of action which does not
depend on fault can be based only on warranty and will only
be available against a privity defendant. 0 For example, a re-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m. (1965). Whether the role of the judi-
ciary in accomplishing this sweeping change was proper remains a matter of substan-
tial debate. See, e.g., Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Pre-
empted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REv. 123 (1974);
Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's? Or Should the Judge's Monument Be
Moved to a Firmer Site? 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469 (1974); Franklin, When Worlds Collide:
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974
(1966). See also the excellent concurring opinion by Judge Fuchsberg in Victorson v.
Bock Laundry Machine Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 404, 335 N.E. 2d 275, 280, 373 N.Y.S.2d
39, 45 (1975). It is quite clear that the disclaimer problem has not evaporated into thin
air merely because comment m has suggested that disclaimers are invalid. See, e.g.,
Velez v. Craine and Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 617, 305 N.E.2d
750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973).
70. The danger that a court in limiting the scope of its strict liability doctrine may
slip back into the privity problem is not peculiar to Wisconsin jurisprudence. In Victor-
son v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1975), the New York Court of Appeals may have accomplished a similar result. The
question in Victorson was whether a plaintiff bringing an action for strict products
liability was to be bound by the contract or Uniform Commercial Code statute of
limitations which begins to run from tender of delivery, U.C.C. § 2-725, or whether the
tort statute of limitations which runs from time of injury was to govern. In the cases
before the court the contract (implied warranty of merchantability) statute had al-
ready run and would have barred the cause of action. Overruling its previous decision
in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d
490 (1969), the court found that the tort statute of limitations would govern. In the
course of its decision the court emphasized that in the case at bar the plaintiff had no
prior association with the manufacturer prior to being injured. The plaintiffs in the
cases before the court were patrons at a commercial laundromat that got their hands
caught in a centrifuge extractor when the lid on the extractors popped up prematurely
while the extractors were still spinning. There is a very strong inference that had a
privity relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant the court could
have limited the plaintiff to the statute of limitations under the Uniform Commercial
Code which would have run from tender of delivery. The concurring opinion by Judge
Fuchsberg takes note of this possibility and argues that the majority opinion should
not be so read.
It is strange that so long into the product liability era a court would revive the
privity doctrine and provide a right to a nonprivity plaintiff that it would deny to a
privity plaintiff. In one significant case, an intermediate appellate court has already
had occasion to apply this doctrine. In DeCosta, Jr. v. A. Reynolds Construction and
Supply Corp., 49 App. Div.2d 476, 375 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1975), the court held that a
plaintiff in privity with the defendant was not entitled to the tort statute of limitations
which runs from the time of injury and was barred by the U.C.C. statute of limita-
tions which ran from tender of delivery. The plaintiff had proceeded originally on a
negligence and breach of warranty theory. Defendant has moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the actions were time-barred. The product in this case was
an in-ground swimming pool which was installed in October 1969. The swimming pool
collapsed and caused injury to plaintiff's property in March 1974. Plaintiff com-
menced his action in January 1975. No appeal was taken from the original dismissal;
thus there was no review of what was almost certainly an erroneous holding with regard
to the negligence claim. In June 1975 plaintiff commenced a cause of action based on
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tailer who sells a coffee pot with faulty electrical wiring can
only realistically be sued for breach of warranty. To bring an
action under the Hallows version of strict liability would be
doomed to failure. No retailer has a duty to inspect the internal
wiring of a prepackaged item. This will only bring us back full
circle to where we were prior to Dippel where the multiplicity
of actions up through the distributive chain was the only
method of bringing a no-fault products liability case against a
manufacturer. Second, it is hard to believe that in the standard
production defect case Wisconsin would be willing to put the
plaintiff through the expense of litigating the merits of the
defendant's quality control system. To be sure, plaintiff, under
Dippel and Powers could make out a prima facie case if able
to establish a defect, but then the defendant has the option of
coming forward with rebuttal testimony. If plaintiff is to be
assured of victory he will be forced to counter the defendant's
case with respect to quality control, otherwise the defendant
may well carry his burden of proof on the question of negli-
gence. Both Greiten7' and Howes72 appreciate that it is too late
in the development of product liability law to allow the very
charade which the courts found so odious in the first instance.
It is apparent that the Wisconsin court does not seek to turn
the clock back a dozen years. The court has in effect told us
why it was that they adopted a strict liability theory modeled
along the lines of negligence per se. There was a very strong
feeling in the court that the adoption of strict liability might
absolve the plaintiff of his responsibility for his own conduct.
If contributory fault (be it contributory negligence or assump-
strict liability. This time the action was barred on collateral estoppel grounds. Uphold-
ing the lower court's finding, the appellate division decided that, since plaintiff was
in privity with the defendant-manufacturer, no cause of action existed in strict tort
liability. The immediate purchaser who stands in privity is bound to the U.C.C. cause
of action and has no separate tort action based on strict liability. The dissent argued
that granting rights to a nonprivity plaintiff greater than to those which inure to a
privity plaintiff was irrational.
The lesson is clear. In developing case law with regard to various aspects of product
liability law, it is important to keep in mind that slight changes in liability rules may
bring us full circle to where we were prior to the revolution, If indeed the Wisconsin
court would have retained the view it had advocated in Powers, there is little question
that the privity plaintiff would have been advantaged by having a strict liability action
based on the implied warranty of merchantability and the nonprivity plaintiff would
have been relegated to the negligence action.
71. 70 Wis. 2d 598, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975).
72. 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
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tion of the risk) is to be a factor in a strict liability action then
the mechanism of the Wisconsin comparative negligence stat-
ute had to be the vehicle. The court simply could not conceive
of adopting an all or nothing contributory negligence formula
after decades of experience with comparative negligence. It
then became concerned as to how the comparative negligence
doctrine would work when the theory of the plaintiff's case was
strict liability. The court said:
It might be contended that the strict liability of the seller
of a defective product is not negligence and therefore cannot
be compared with the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
The liability imposed is not grounded upon a failure to exer-
cise ordinary care with its necessary element of foreseeability;
it is much more akin to negligence per se.73
The court then went on to explain that it could accomplish a
comparison of fault by structuring strict liability on a negli-
gence per se principle.
The short response to the court's approach is that it is the
clearest case of the tail wagging the dog that one can imagine.
The metaphor seems particularly appropriate when one notes
that the court's authority to accomplish this maneuver arose
from the strict liability dog bite cases. In those cases the court
stated that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff could be
measured against the strict liability of the owner of a dog be-
cause strict liability was really not strict liability but merely
negligence per se. 74 In a later section of this paper the appropri-
ate role of the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk within the context of product liabil-
ity law will be examined. It is this author's view that these
defenses, be they in the form of an absolute bar or as a reduc-
tion of the plaintiff's verdict based on the percentage of his
fault, have been given altogether too much play under the
product liability theory. However, if there are appropriate cir-
cumstances where the plaintiff's verdict is to be reduced by the
percentage of fault, why must that be accomplished under the
doctrine of comparative negligence?
73. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 461, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (1967). This is con-
firmed by the court's recent statement in Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 273-
74, 238 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1976).
74. Wurtzler v. Miller, 31 Wis. 2d 310, 143 N.W.2d 27 (1966); Nelson v. Hansen,
10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d 251 (1960).
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In a products liability case in which plaintiff's fault is oper-
ative it is clear that there are two factors at work that cause
the plaintiff's injury: (1) the defective product and (2) the
plaintiff's conduct in using, misusing, or abusing the product.
There appear to be two ways to reduce plaintiff's verdict based
on the percentage of his fault.
The first is to frankly acknowledge that what is involved in
comparative negligence is not so much a comparative process
in evaluating fault but rather a decision based on equity and
justice; that is, that a plaintiff ought not to recover the entirety
of his damages when he himself has been at fault. What is done
is rather to focus on the plaintiff's behavior and to ask by what
percentage should the plaintiffs recovery be reduced. A cynic
might suggest that, in fact, this is how comparative negligence
operates in most instances. The jury views the totality of events
leading up to an injury and decides that in assessing total
blame for the injury it believes plaintiff has contributed a cer-
tain amount.
There is evidence that comparative negligence is less a
strict comparison of fault than it is a kind of homespun judg-
ment that plaintiff should have his verdict reduced by what the
jury considers to be an amount reflecting his participation in
the injury. The last several years have seen a great deal of
controversy concerning whether a plaintiff should have his ver-
dict reduced due to his failure to wear a seat belt." Many courts
have not credited the defense since the plaintiff was not the
cause of the accident but only the cause of the aggravation of
his own injuries. It is interesting to compare the approach that
the Wisconsin and New York courts have taken to this rather
complex question.
In Spier v. Barker" the New York Court of Appeals, prior
to the time that the legislature adopted a comparative fault
statute,77 took the position that plaintiff should have his recov-
75. Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense-State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1970).
See Note, 3 HOFSTRA L. REv. 883 (1975).
76. 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974). See also Note, 3
HOFs-rRA L. REV. 883 (1975).
77. New York adopted the "pure" form of comparative negligence for causes of
action accruing on or after September 1, 1975. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1413 (McKinney
Supp. 1975). It is possible that New York might have opted for the comparative
negligence approach to the seat belt question rather than the avoidable consequences
approach if New York would have had a comparative negligence doctrine at the time
the court was faced with Spier v. Barker. There is an intimation to that effect in the
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ery reduced by the amount that the injury would have been
reduced had the plaintiff been wearing a seat belt. For exam-
ple, if defendant were traveling thirty miles per hour over the
speed limit and he lost control of his car and collided with the
plaintiff who, because he was not wearing his seat belt, was
thrown from the car, the defendant would only be liable for the
damages caused by the first collision. The defendant would not
be liable for the add-on injuries which resulted because the
plaintiff failed to wear his seat belt.78
The Wisconsin court faced the same question in Bentzler v.
Braun" and took the position that the principle of comparative
negligence was appropriate and a jury should award damages
based on the overall assessment of fault. If we are to seek ana-
lytical purity it is clear that one of two different techniques
must be utilized: (1) plaintiff should be 100 percent at fault for
his add-on injuries and zero percent at fault for his first colli-
sion injuries0 or (2) the second collision injuries are an amal-
Appellate Division decision. Spier v. Barker, 42 App. Div. 428, 431, 348 N.Y.S.2d 581,
583 (1973).
78. The court in the Spier case made it clear that the burden of pleading and
proving that nonuse of the seat belt by the plaintiff resulted in increasing the extent
of his injuries rests on the defendant. Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d at 450, 453, 323
N.E.2d at 167, 169,363 N.Y.S.2d at 920, 922. It may be that the court chose the analogy
to avoidable consequences rather than contributory negligence so that it could shift
the burden of proof to the defendant on the issue of injury aggravation. Under New
York law at the time, plaintiff bore the burden of proving freedom from contributory
negligence. See discussion on this point in Note, 3 HoFsm L. Rav. 883, 895 (1975).
79. 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
80. This would be the exact result reached by applying the avoidable consequences
doctrine. This was, of course, the holding in Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444,323 N.E.2d
164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974). The court in Bentzler opted instead for applying the
comparative negligence doctrine. It did not require that the comparative negligence
doctrine operate only on the add-on injuries. It will be recalled that the New York
court in Spier thought that the second collision injuries were severable and could be
determined by expert testimony. In cases where the injuries are clearly severable the
Wisconsin court has indicated that alternative (2) mentioned in the text be adopted,
i.e., that the comparison of negligence is to be performed on the second collision
injuries. See Johnson v. Heintz, 61 Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973), and Johnson v.
Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976). That the Wisconsin court saw fit to
treat the first and second collision injuries as a unitary whole is a matter of some
significance. The court had available to it the Spier alternative or the alternative
(2) set forth in the text. By rejecting these alternatives and opting to treat the injuries
as nonseverable, the court must have realized that it was opting for a common-sense
apportionment of fault rather than a strict damage apportionment or a combination
of fault-damage apportionment. It is this observation that led the author to the conclu-
sion in the text that the court was not dealing with a clear comparison of negligence.
The defendant's negligence in causing the collision and the plaintiff's negligence in
aggravating his injuries by failing to "buckle-up" are not truly comparable.
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gam of the defendant's fault in causing the collision and the
plaintiff's fault in failing to wear his seat belt. To permit the
comparative negligence question to operate on the entire injury
event would simply seem incorrect. Nevertheless, the
Wisconsin court did not see fit to bifurcate the first collision
damages and the second collision damages which resulted from
the failure to wear the seat belt and opted instead for a general
homespun evaluation of fault for the entire injury. The point
to be made here is not that the Wisconsin court erred in its
analysis of the seat belt defense for it seems to me that in a
common sense way the court dealt intelligently with what is a
most complex problem. The court took the position that plain-
tiffs should bear responsibility for some safety and that it
It is interesting to speculate as to the reason the Wisconsin court opted for the
comparative fault approach to this problem. This author's guess is that the court felt
that the complexity of the trial process where one would have to establish the exact
amount of the injuries caused by the first and second collision led the court to fear an
approach based on damage apportionment. To be sure, even under Bentzler v. Braun,
there must be evidence that there was a causal relationship between the failure to wear
the seat belt and the aggravated injuries, but this is far different from requiring an
exact damage apportionment. The attempt to analogize these cases to the passive
negligence situation where plaintiff's activities cause his injury but not the collision is
not altogether successful. See, e.g., Dutcher v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 37 Wis. 2d 591, 155
N.W.2d 609 (1968), and Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 91, 118
N.W.2d 140 (1963). In those cases the activity of the plaintiff must reduce the plain-
tiff's recovery vis-a-vis the entirety of his damages. There are no damages strictly
attributable to the plaintiff's conduct alone. This is not the situation in the seat
belt cases where the court had the option to apportion damages but instead chose to
apportion fault.
It should be noted, however, that in Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d
431 (1975), the court adopted the rule that an automobile manufacturer is liable for
the aggravation of injuries caused by the failure of the manufacturer to design the auto
so that it will respond with reasonable safety to a collision. In the text of the opinion
the court cites with approval Larson v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.
1968), and specifically cites the following passage from Larson:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the manufacturer
to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer should be liable for that
portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above
the damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the
impact or collision absent the defective design.
Id. at 503, quoted at 66 Wis. 2d at 561, 225 N.W.2d at 437. The court thus seems to
concur with Larson that second collision damages are severable. This raises the ques-
tion as to why the court did not so hold in the seat belt case and adopt the view of
Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 323 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974). It may be
that in the auto design-second collision cases there was no other analytical scheme to
accomplish the apportionment of damages. Faced with a better alternative in the seat
belt case (i.e. apportionment of fault), the court took what it considered to be the




would leave to the good sense of the jury just how to evaluate
plaintiff's share in the overall injury setting."' If one were to
compare the negligence of the defendant and the negligence of
the plaintiff, one would be doomed to failure since the negli-
gence of the two parties took place at different times and
played different roles in the accident. Instead the court opted
not for a comparison of the negligence but rather for a reduc-
tion of plaintiffs verdict based on a visceral assessment of the
role that plaintiff played in the injury.
A second method of looking at the comparative fault prob-
lem in strict products liability is to assess the percentage of
fault of the defendant based on the seriousness of the product
defect and the causal role the defect played in the injury. To
be sure, this would be a partial admission that strict liability
is based on fault principles and that it is assumed that the
more serious the defect the more culpable is the defendant.
Admittedly, under a pure strict liability theory there need be
no necessary correlation between the seriousness of the defect
and the conduct of the defendant. Innocent or slightly negli-
gent conduct might lead to a very serious defect in a product.
But we must remember we do not live in the best of all possible
worlds. It is a compensation system that we are administering
not a closed philosophical system. In this imperfect world it is
not an outrageous inference that a bad defect most probably
stems from serious fault-even if the fault need not nor cannot
be established.
There remains one final question to confront. Given the
81. The Wisconsin approach which utilizes the comparative fault methodology for
reducing damages seems far superior to the approach of the New York court in Spier
v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 323 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974), which is based on
the doctrine of avoidable consequences. Consider the following hypothetical. Defen-
dant speeding 30 m.p.h. over the limit crosses the median strip and collides with a
plaintiff who has failed to fasten his seat belt. Plaintiff is thrown from the car and
suffers serious injuries amounting to $100,000. There is evidence presented that had
the plaintiff been wearing his seat belt, his injuries would have been minor and his
damages would only be $10,000. Under the New York apportionment of dam-
ages-avoidable consequences theory-the plaintiff would only be entitled to recover
$10,000 from the defendant. The $90,000 add-on injuries which were due to his failure
to buckle-up would fall on the plaintiff. Under the Wisconsin comparative fault ap-
proach a jury would be entitled to reduce plaintiff's recovery by their assessment of
the plaintiff's fault in the overall injury situation. The fairness of the Wisconsin result
over that of New York in this instance seems obvious. This is, of course, the result of




tenor of the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute, 2 which
specifically speaks of comparing the negligence of the plaintiff
against that of the defendant, are the Wisconsin court and
other courts that face similar statutory language free to carve
out a doctrine of comparative fault along the lines suggested
above? Although one can appreciate the reluctance of courts to
so interpret their statutes, the problem hardly is worth the
agonizing in which the courts have indulged . 3 On this point I
am in complete agreement with Professor Victor Schwartz who
is puzzled by the judicial timidity of courts that fear adopting
comparative negligence in a strict liability situation. 4 Admit-
tedly, some courts have shown reluctance to adopt comparative
negligence without legislative direction. 5 Scholars have de-
bated the wisdom of the reluctance of courts to overturn by
common law rule the doctrine of contributory negligence-a
common law rule itself.8 6 A major stumbling block for many
courts has been the broad choice of competing negligence doc-
trines from which to choose. When placed against the back-
ground of an ingrained rule of contributory negligence it is
understandable that some courts have felt that a legislative
solution was necessary. However, for a state with a long history
of comparative negligence in which the various and sundry
intricacies of the doctrine have been worked out to refuse to
82. Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1973) reads as follows:
Contributory negligence. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an
action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negli-
gence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence
was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
For a full compilation of the various forms of comparative negligence, see V. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 43-81 (1974) [hereinafter cited as COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE]. Some statutes are free of the comparative "negligence" problem since
they do not contain words limiting the principle to cases of negligence. Id. at 196.
83. Note 56 supra and accompanying text. See also Kirkland v. General Motors
Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Okla. 1974); Wurtzlerv. Miller, 31 Wis. 2d 310, 143 N.W.2d
27 (1966); Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d 251 (1960).
84. See COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE supra note 82 at 196. This author's disagreement
with Professor Schwartz is chronicled in the third section of this paper. See notes 109
to 123 infra and accompanying text.
85. Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968); Parsonson v. Construction
Equip. Co., 386 Mich. 61, 191 N.W.2d 465 (1971).
86. Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should
the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1968). See also Nga Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v.
Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
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adopt comparative fault when faced with strict liability is al-
most ludicrous. The legislative will is clear. The implementa-
tion mechanism for the reduction of plaintiff's verdict is well
established. If ever a court had the right to extend by analogy
without waiting for further legislation on the subject, this
would appear the appropriate occasion.
Wisconsin and other states seeking to work out strict liabil-
ity theory need not recoil from the doctrine of strict liability nor
need they impose the doctrine of contributory negligence as a
complete bar. The doctrine of comparative fault, when viewed
as a tool of justice, is readily available without either distorting
the law of products liability or returning us to the neanderthal
doctrine of contributory negligence as a complete bar.
5. Negligence and the Unreasonably Dangerous Product-
The Riddle of Greiten v. La Dow
Where a plaintiff proves negligence-in this case, the lack of
ordinary care in the design of a product-there is no doubt
that there may be recovery in the event the defective design
results in an unreasonably dangerous product, but there may
be recovery for the negligent design of a product even though
it is not unreasonably dangerous in the 402A sense."7
The occasion for the utterance of this strange statement was
Greiten v. La Dow, a design defect case. Plaintiff, an employee
of a lithographing company, brought an action against the de-
signer and installer of a retractable board holder. The board
holder was located at the delivery end of a printing press; its
function was to collect printed material as it came off the press.
The board holder was supported by angle irons which extended
and remained extended as long as electrical current flowed to
the press. Should the power be turned off, or fail, the angle
irons would retract-the plywood board and any paper on it
would drop a minimal distance onto the wooden skid of the
press. The plaintiff was injured when a crew working on the
press was changing a loaded skid. A hand truck had been
pushed under the skid and had become stuck there. When the
plaintiff reached under the skid to shake the hand truck loose,
a circuit breaker opened and cut off the electricity causing the
87. 70 Wis. 2d 589, 603, 235 N.W.2d 677, 685 (1975) (emphasis added). As noted
earlier, this statement is found in what the court later acknowledged is the majority
opinion. See note 65 supra.
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angle irons to retract and the plywood board with paper to fall
on the plaintiff's head.
The defect alleged by the plaintiff was that the press should
have been produced with a different design-one which would
have permitted the angle irons to remain extended, even in the
event of a power failure."8
The plaintiff proceeded in this case under a theory of negli-
gence, rather than strict tort liability, claiming that the defen-
dant was careless in the design and manufacture of the ma-
chine and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident and his injuries. The court decided that, as a matter
of law, plaintiff did not establish that the design actually uti-
lized was a result of the defendant's negligence. Although
plaintiff had suggested alternative designs, his suggestions
were so speculative and frought with their own dangers that
negligence could not be established in this case. If this alone
had been its holding, Greiten would have soon passed into
oblivion as merely a factual affirmance of a directed verdict
based on evidence that was insufficient to make out a prima
facie case. Instead, the court took the occasion to set forth an
exposition on the concept of negligence. It questioned whether
it was necessary to find that a product was defective and/or
unreasonably dangerous when the plaintiff proceeded on a neg-
ligence theory.
The court in Greiten held that in a negligence case it was
not necessary to establish that the product was defective or
unreasonably dangerous. I admit to being mystified by this
holding. It seems quite clear that unless the court is using strict
liability language in a very special way, it is clearly wrong.
There is some evidence, however, that the terminology prob-
lems are substantial. Unless it is clarified in the near future,
serious confusion is likely to continue.
In explaining its position that a cause of action for negli-
gence does not require plaintiff to establish an unreasonably
dangerous defect, the court stated:
All that it is necessary to prove is that the product is designed
with a lack of ordinary care and that lack of care resulted in
injury. No test of negligence has been called to the attention
of this writer that requires that the product be unreasonably
dangerous in order to predicate liability.89
88. 70 Wis. 2d at 594 n.1, 235 N.W.2d at 681 n.1.
89. Id. at 603, 235 N.W.2d at 685. See note 65 supra.
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Remembering that we are herein concerned with a design de-
fect case, this statement above quoted is simply incomprehen-
sible. If we assume that the defendant failed to act reasonably
in the design process, we are obliged to inquire as to what
resulted from the negligent behavior of the defendant. The
answer must be that there was some design aspect of the prod-
uct that was inadequate. If the negligence had resulted in noth-
ing at all, then we could indeed label the defendant's conduct
sloppy or careless-but certainly not negligent. Negligence is,
after all, the creation of unreasonable risks to the world at
large. Thus, we must focus on the design parameters of the
product that are inadequate. But, we return now to the basic
question by what standards are we to judge the inadequacy of
the design. As indicated earlier, this standard, in a design de-
fect case, must be an external one since there is nothing inher-
ently wrong with the product. The two standards suggested
previously" in the two-tier test for product defect are: (1) the
consumer expectation test, and if that test is met, then the
more demanding (2) "unreasonable danger" test, based on
risk-utility considerations. It simply will not do to state that
the negligence which causes harm is grounds for liability in a
products case. The crucial middle step cannot be eliminated in
that negligence has to result in a finding that some aspect of
the product is below acceptable quality, otherwise the negli-
gence has simply washed out into nothingness.
I believe, however, that there is a clue in Greiten v. La Dow,
that the Wisconsin court is not advocating such a farfetched
view. In referring to its desire to abolish the term "unreasona-
bly dangerous" from products actions based on negligence the
court states:
The use of that and similar terms was laid to rest in Smith
v. Atco Co. when we discarded the term, "inherently danger-
ous." We said therein:
"If a manufacturer or supplier is hereafter to be relieved
from liability as a matter of law by the courts, such
result should be reached on the basis there was no cau-
sal negligence established against the defendant rather
than that the product was not inherently dangerous."'"
90. See text accompanying notes 24 to 55.
91. 70 Wis. 2d at 604, 235 N.W.2d at 686 (emphasis added).
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Focusing on this language, it is likely that the court is con-
cerned with the connotation or the tenor of the term "unreason-
ably dangerous." The term sounds as if the requisite proof for
a product defect is some form of "extraordinary" danger. This
is a legitimate concern. A leading scholar has suggested that
the selfsame concern motivated the California court in the
Cronin" case to abandon the concept of unreasonable danger
as an element of the jury instruction on the defect issue. 3 I
rather disagree that this was the concern of the California court
in Cronin.4 But, it does appear that this is the concern of the
Wisconsin court in Greiten. Some doubt is cast on this analy-
sis, however, by the court's discussion in Howes v. Deere &
Co.,"5 in which the court again attempted to draw the distinc-
tion between strict liability and negligence. This time the court
saw fit to withdraw a statement it had made in Vincer v. Esther
Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co. The court in
Howes proclaimed:
It may be that some of the difficulty in distinguishing
between the elements encompassed in the common-law negli-
gence rule and the negligence per se doctrine are attributable
to the opinions of this court. The opinion in Vincer v. Esther
Wins. All-Alum. S. Pool Co. (1975), 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230
N.W.2d 794, contains the following statement at page 330:
". .. However, even under negligence law the plaintiff
still must prove that the product causing the injury was
dangerous and defective.
The statement is not relevant to the ultimate decision in the
case and is herewith withdrawn.
The court is apparently maintaining that it is not necessary to
prove a defect in a negligence case. The question remains: if
there is no defect, what was the result of the negligent act?
Perhaps, here too, the court is concerned that the language
"dangerous and defective" connotes a sense of special danger.
The short answer to all of the above is that neither in negli-
gence nor in strict liability litigation need the plaintiff prove
92. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972).
93. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
839 (1973).
94. See Donaher, supra note 23, at 1304.
95. 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
96. Id. at 274, 238 N.W.2d at 80 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 60:297
RETHINKING PRODUCTS LIABILITY
anything other than that the product is below the standard
which society has a right to expect-reasonable safety. If the
phraseology of a jury instruction is a problem, I suggest that
the recent Pattern Jury Instruction adopted for use by trial
judges in New York would resolve the problem. It provides that
a product is defective
if it is not reasonably safe-that is if the product is so likely
to be harmful to persons or property that a reasonably pru-
dent person who had actual knowledge of its harmful charac-
ter would conclude that it should not have been marketed in
that condition. 7
The instruction then emphasizes the strict liability aspect by
referring directly to the elimination of "scienter" as an element
of a strict liability case:
It is not necessary to find that the seller had or should have
had knowledge of the harmful character of the product in
order to determine that it is not reasonably safe. It is suffi-
cient that a reasonably prudent person who did in fact know
of its harmful character would have concluded that the prod-
uct should not have been marketed in that condition."
It thus becomes clear that the only distinction between negli-
gence and strict liability is the scienter element of the case.
Both negligence and strict liability require a defective or "not
reasonably safe" product. In negligence, one must prove that
the defendant's conduct which brought about the defect was
below the standard of the "reasonable person." In strict liabil-
ity, one may judge the defectiveness out of the fact that the
product is not reasonably safe, without accounting for the con-
duct of the defendant.
II. ALLOCATION OF PROOF PROBLEMS-THE MIDDLE-AGED
PRODUCT
In the course of its experience with products liability cases,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has explored some of the
difficult problems which arise when plaintiff seeks to establish
that the defect which caused his injury was present in the
product when it left the hands of the manufacturer. In Jagmin
v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,99 the court, in a sensitive and highly
97. NEw YoRK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIvIL No. 2:141 (Supp. 1976).
98. Id.
99. 61 Wis. 2d 60, 211 N.W.2d 810 (1973).
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perceptive opinion, sought to establish guidelines for the reso-
lution of the "middle-aged" product problem.
In every products liability case, the plaintiff must establish
not only a defect, but that the product was in a defective condi-
tion when it left the possession or control of the seller.' 0 This
is not a problem in many instances. When the plaintiff is able
to establish the exact nature of the specific defect through
expert testimony or where the circumstantial evidence is such
that an expert can conclude that a defect existed at the time
of manufacture, this element of the case can be made out. In a
large number of cases, however, this mode of proof is not possi-
ble. There are several reasons for this. First, products liability
cases are frequently violent events. The evidence oftentimes
"self-destructs," and we are left with little more than the "say-
so" of the plaintiff as to how the accident occurred. Second,
and more important, prior to the accident the product may
have been through substantial use. Thus, even if at the time
of injury there was in fact a defect in the product, it may
become very difficult to establish that the defect existed at the
time of manufacture. In these instances, plaintiff must resort
to some form of res ipsa loquitur.' °' In a strict liability case, the
inference that one must make is that, more probably than not,
the accident would not have occurred in the absence of a defect
and that the defect existed when the product left the hands of
the manufacturer.' 2 For this inference to be a rational one the
courts have demanded that the plaintiff establish the "chain
of control" with regard to the product so that the plaintiff can
negate other probable causes which could have introduced the
defect in the product or which were themselves the cause of the
accident. ,03
In Jagmin, the court was faced with just such a problem.
Plaintiff was injured when a grinding wheel attached to a port-
able cup grinder which he was operating broke and struck him
in the face. The grinding wheel, when new, was two inches in
thickness and could be used until it was ground down to one-
half inch in thickness. Plaintiff testified that he had put a new
100. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
101. See the excellent discussion on this point in Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,





wheel on the night before the accident and had used it not more
than three-quarters of an hour before quitting. He then used
the new wheel for about half an hour the morning of the acci-
dent. He testified that the wheel was about one and one-half
inches thick and had at least four or five hours of grinding on
it. On these facts alone the res ipsa type inference would have
been fully warranted. Tihere was, however, a real question as
to whether the grinding wheel in question had been used by
someone on the night shift who might have misused it and thus
have introduced a defect into the product.104 This was further
complicated by the inability of establishing whether the wheel
which was involved in the accident was the one which the
experts examined or whether another wheel had been substi-
tuted instead.
The Wisconsin court resolved the problem by concluding
that there was sufficient evidence in this case to go to the jury.
It found that there was a legitimate fact question presented as
to whether the wheel had been used by the night shift and that
question was appropriately for the jury. It is hard to disagree
with the court, in that the court dealt carefully and sensitively
with fact issues which it believed should not have been resolved
by directed verdict. However, it is time that this problem be
placed in a far broader perspective.
In cases where defect cannot be definitively established by
expert testimony, the proof problems appear in what, for want
of better terminology, shall be referred to as the young, the
middle-aged and the old product. The cases at either extreme
can be disposed of easily. The "young" product is best repre-
sented by the brand new car in use for only several hundred
miles. After plaintiff loses control of the car for unexplained
reasons, the question will arise as to whether the car was defec-
tive. Since the car is so new, plaintiff is able to account for
almost every movement of the car. If plaintiff is able to nega-
tive the possibility of his own negligent conduct as a cause of
the accident, the inference of defect is compelling. This was the
scenario in some of the most celebrated products cases in the
literature. Henningsfield v. Bloomfield Motors"0 5 and Codling
v. Paglial6 both involved new cars in which the steering mecha-
104. Id. at 75-77, 211 N.W.2d at 818-19.
105. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (19601.
106. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
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nisms unexplainedly failed. Although the plaintiffs were not
able to establish the defect with specificity, the inference of
defect was so compelling that negating misuse was simply not
a major problem. At the other end of the spectrum, it is clear
that when a product has been in use for a very long period of
time, unless the plaintiff is able to isolate the defect and con-
vincingly prove that the defect was in the product when it left
the hands of the manufacturer, he is destined to lose his case.
No court is prepared to hypothesize as to the multitudinous
causes which might have impaired the quality of an automobile
that was driven some fifty thousand miles.
The problem arises, as the Wisconsin court correctly per-
ceived, in the middle range or what I call the "middle-aged"
product. The question is not only how long is a product sup-
posed to last, but also how much abuse is a product expected
to take; and finally, how much abuse did this particular prod-
uct take in fact. The tendency of courts has been to treat this
problem as an evidentiary one. Verdicts are either affirmed or
reversed on the basis of whether plaintiff has done enough to
negate the possible other causes of the defect. It becomes neces-
sary then, for the plaintiff to go through his period of product
ownership and convince a court that nothing untoward or irre-
sponsible was done to the product. We give witness daily, in the
exploding bottle cases, to the charade of parties solemnly testi-
fying that they did nothing to the bottle which could have
brought about the explosion. The evidence in this whole class
of cases takes on an "Alice in Wonderland" kind of quality with
people testifying as to their lifelong experience with the prod-
uct and trying to account for that which no human memory can
account. Or, we place the fortunes of a case in the hands of
third parties such as auto mechanics who have had the oppor-
tunity to affect the defect. The question then becomes one of
credibility, and as the number of intervening causes mount the
less credible the plaintiff's case becomes. The sheer waste of
judicial effort in trying to discover the undiscoverable through
the presentation of evidence is staggering.
The first step in resolving this problem is to recognize that
we have been permitting marketing problems to masquerade as
basic liability questions. It is strange that the question of how
long is a product supposed to last is viewed to be within the
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purview of the jury in the standard product liability case.'" ' If
a car, for example, becomes a dangerous instrumentality after
six years, and a hair dryer subject to serious failure after three
years, those facts are well within the possession of manufactur-
ers. Repair data and product life information are calculated by
major industry and figure into the determination of output. To
be sure, this data is not able to pinpoint product failure with
exactitude.' °8 But product deterioration information is avail-
able in the sense that there is knowledge of when the trouble-
some period tends to set in. Yet, for some reason this informa-
tion is kept a deep dark secret from the consuming public. It
is only when plaintiffs bring a product claim that product life
becomes a focal question. It does seem ludicrous to send the
issue of how long should a product last to a jury when industry
knows the answer to that question-and could affect consumer
behavior by sharing it with the public.
The realization that product life is determinable by the
manufacturer not only affects the question of how long a prod-
uct should last, but could also help in resolving the question
of intervening causes which could have contributed to the de-
fect. To be sure, that problem cannot be totally eliminated, but
if realistic guides as to product life became part of the market-
ing scheme, there would be a ready method for resolving the
alternate cause question. Since products are meant to last for
a certain period of time and take normal abuse within that
period, a prima facie case of product failure should be made out
when the product fails within that period of time. The burden
should then shift to the defendant to establish that the defect
came into being through some cause that was abnormal in
character and not a consequence of normal consumer use. This
would free us from the process of speculating over the lists of
horribles that could, or might have happened within the nor-
mal life span of the product.
III. PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO THE PRODUCT-THE NEED FOR A
JUDICIOUS USE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
In an earlier section our discussion focused on whether the
107. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E. 2d 401
(1969).
108. Admittedly this information is not equally available for all products. In many
instances the variables with regard to the extent of use may make a marketing ap-
proach to this problem difficult.
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comparative negligence doctrine could be woven into the fabric
of strict liability law.' 9 Although we concluded that there were
no theoretical difficulties in applying the doctrine to a strict
lability case, we left open the question as to whether it is appro-
priate to apply the comparative negligence doctrine in every
case where plaintiff's fault has contributed to the injury in a
strict liability situation. The Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 402A, comment n provides:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based
upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule
applied to strict liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect
in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its exist-
ence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence
which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to
encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the
name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section
as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer
discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and neverthe-
less proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is
injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
Although this comment has been endorsed by a large number
of courts,"10 there is substantial question whether the substance
of the comment will withstand the onslaught of the compara-
tive negligence doctrine. Professor Schwartz has argued that
the Restatement position was justified only so long as contribu-
tory negligence or assumption of the risk were a complete bar
to plaintiff's recovery."' However, now that courts have avail-
able to them the doctrine of comparative negligence in which
both contributory negligence and assumption of the risk go
only to reduce the plaintiff's recovery, it is unfair to saddle the
109. See text accompanying footnotes 73 to 86 supra.
110. See, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Williams v. Brown
Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53
N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746
(1966). See also Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence,
and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972); Twerski, Old Wine in a New
Flask, supra note 31.
Note that the Wisconsin court did not adopt the Restatement comments in Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
111. Schwartz, supra note 82 at 203-07. Schwartz, Strict Liability and Compara-
tive Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171, 177 (1974).
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defendant manufacturer with the entire loss. It is only fair to
make the plaintiff bear that portion of the loss which represents
his contribution to the injury event.
The argument is not unpersuasive. It is clearly the operat-
ing principle in Wisconsin,"2 and several other jurisdictions."'
In my opinion, the principle presumes far too much and re-
quires sharp delimitation before it can be utilized as an operat-
ing principle in product liability law. The following hypotheti-
cals will provide a medium for further discussion: (1) Plaintiff
was driving on the highway in his 1976 XYZ model car. He was
speeding at twenty miles per hour over the limit. He lost con-
trol of the auto and collided with the median strip retainer.
Due to a defectively designed door latch plaintiff was thrown
from the car and suffered serious injuries. His injuries would
have been minor had the door latch held."' (2) Plaintiff was
injured when a poorly beaded tire on his car blew out. At the
time of the accident plaintiff was speeding twenty miles per
hour over the limit. The evidence is such that had plaintiff
been driving at the appropriate speed limit he would have been
able to bring his car under control and could have avoided
impact with another car. (3) Plaintiff was an experienced fac-
tory worker who at the time of the accident was helping operate
a machine designed to break glass and stack glass strips. He
was working on the west side of the machine while his supervi-
sor operated the controls on the east side of the machine. As
112. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
113. Edwards v. Sears & Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975); Hagen-
buch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972). See also Codling v.
Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973) and Micallef v.
Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976), in which it is clear that the New
York court is willing to entertain contributory negligence as a defense to a strict
liability action. The Micallef case is particularly revealing since the court overruled
the patent danger rule, yet continued to permit contributory negligence to operate as
a defense. It is unlikely that the New York court would have taken this step if contribu-
tory negligence would be a total bar since there would be few cases where the affirma-
tive defense would not bar the plaintiff. It is likely that the court, fully cognizant that
the state finally had a comparative fault statute, supra note 77, felt that plaintiffs
would now'truly benefit from the abolition of the patent danger rule. There is no
question that the legislative intent in New York was to have the comparative negli-
gence statute apply in strict liability actions. 1975 N.Y. (McKINNEY's) LEG. REP. 1485-
86. The court could have by judicial interpretation limited the statute to cases which
meet the standards set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n.
It chose not to do so in Micallef.




he continued to operate the machine plaintiff noticed that glass
appeared to be jamming the machine, and he became con-
cerned that the machine was being damaged. To thwart this
possibility plaintiff attempted to remove a piece of glass with
his hand, but his glove caught in the machinery and he was
injured. There was evidence presented in the case that the glass
cutting machine was defective in that it did not contain ade-
quate safety features such as off-on switches on both sides of
the machine, or a barrier or guard to keep individuals from
putting their extremities into the machine.15
In attempting to delineate the appropriate role for the af-
firmative defenses which arise from plaintiff's interaction with
the product, it is first necessary to focus on the defendant's
duty in manufacturing a reasonably safe product. The duty of
producing a nondefective product under strict liability has
been placed on the manufacturer. The harm that has befallen
the plaintiff is directly within the risk of the defect against
which the manufacturer has a duty to guard. Thus, in the
above hypotheticals the defendant has a clear duty to manu-
facture a car with a latch that will withstand collision, a tire
which will not blow out at 65 miles per hour and a glass cutting
machine that will protect users from getting their hands caught
at the point of operation. By recognizing the contributory negli-
gence defense in any form (either as a complete bar or as com-
parative negligence), we are reducing the defendant's liability
exposure to users who are clearly within the orbit of defen-
dant's responsibility.
The question then arises: is this not common to contribu-
tory negligence whenever it is utilized as a defense to a tort
action? Negligent defendants, after all, do have a duty to pro-
tect even contributorily negligent plaintiffs. If plaintiffs are
barred from recovering or have their recoveries reduced, it is
because the law censures their activity, not because it condones
the conduct of the defendant. There is, however, an important
distinction between the product liability picture and general
negligence litigation. Consider for a moment a standard auto-
mobile accident in which the defendant is involved in negligent
activity (i.e., speeding) and plaintiff is involved in contributo-
115. This case is similar to Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603




rily negligent activity (e.g., negligent lookout). An accident
takes place and both participants are the proximate cause of
the harm. Although each could reasonably foresee the possibil-
ity of the other's act, the defendant did not provide the matrix
for the plaintiff's action. In products liability cases the opposite
is true. How a consumer will interact with a product is a func-
tion of both design and marketing. if plaintiff is involved in
negligent activity while either using or misusing the product,
it may be that we ought to demand that the product be de-
signed and marketed so that the particular offensive use will
either be precluded or mitigated by some design parameter of
the product. If this is the desideratum of the law, then it be-
comes very questionable whether plaintiffs should have their
verdicts reduced when the very aspect which made the product
dangerous and defective in the first instance has resulted in the
very harm which one could expect from the defective design.
It is evident that in certain instances courts will be unwill-
ing to consider the contributory negligence defense whether it
be clothed as a complete bar or as comparative negligence.
Hypothetical (1) places the question in very sharp focus. In
that case a speeding plaintiff was thrown from a car which was
designed with a defective door latch when the car collided with
a median strip retainer. Query, should a court consider the fact
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in bringing about the
collision through his speeding? There is, to this author's knowl-
edge, no clear judicial authority on the matter. No one seems
to have directly considered the matter."' It is quite clear that
116. In Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3rd 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1976), the problem discussed in the text surfaced in an indirect fashion. Plaintiff
while driving her car was forced to swerve to avoid a car which had suddenly swung
into her lane of traffic. As she steered to the right, plaintiff brought her left hand across
the horn cap in the center of the steering wheel. The horn cap was defectively designed
in that it was too easily removable. Below the horn cap were three sharp prongs that
held the horn cap in place. Plaintiff's chin collided with the sharp prongs and she
suffered serious injury. Plaintiff sought to hold General Motors liable for the aggrava-
tion of her injuries which were due to the defective design of the horn cap and the sharp
prongs which would, upon collision, cause serious injuries to the driver. In affirming a
jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court was faced with the contention that plaintiff
failed to wear her seat belt, and that had she been wearing her seat belt, her injuries
would have been much reduced. The court, citing its previous decision in Luque v.
McLean, 8 Cal. 3rd 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972), held that the only
defense to a strict liability action was voluntary and unreasonable assumption of a
known risk. The court found that there was no evidence that plaintiff was aware that
the car had an easily removable horn cap which masked sharp prongs. Thus, the
defense was not allowed.
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in those jurisdictions where contributory negligence is a
complete bar no court would dare to suggest that the plaintiff's
conduct in bringing about the accident should bar him from
recovering for second collision damages. The entire theory of
second collision recovery is based on the premise that accidents
are foreseeable and that manufacturers should design their cars
to take this into account. One might, however, consider the
possibility of using the comparative negligence doctrine to re-
duce plaintiff's recovery for second collision damages since
both plaintiff and defendant are responsible for bringing them
about. This would not be unlike the seat belt cases where the
Wisonsin court has permitted the reduction of plaintiffs recov-
ery based on plaintiff's failure to wear the seat belt."1 7 The use
of the comparative negligence doctrine would go toward reduc-
ing the plaintiff's recovery for his entire injury rather than
bifurcating the first and second collision injuries.
Having set forth the theoretical possibility, I suggest that
it should be categorically rejected. In a second collision case
where plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries which were aggra-
vated by the defendant's failure to properly design the vehicle
The dissent by Justice Clark raises the issue of comparative negligence. He argues
that California's judicial adoption of compartive negligence in Nga Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal. 3rd 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), should govern in this
instance. He contends that the equitable principles of comparative negligence should
operate in a strict liability situation as well. As set forth in the text accompanying
notes 74-86 supra the author is in substantial agreement with the dissenting position
as to the applicability of the comparative fault doctrine in a strict liability case.
What is troubling in this instance is the uncritical readiness to apply comparative
negligence to the fact situation before the court. If second collision liability is to be
imposed on General Motors, it is because there is a need to protect plaintiffs be they
negligent or contributorily negligent from needless injury when cars collide. The fault
of General Motors is in not designing its car so that when a driver is involved in a
collision his injuries will not be aggravated. The foreseeability and liability of General
Motors should, thus, logically attach even to a nonbelted plaintiff.
Perhaps an argument can, however, be made that in this particular case, plaintiff's
verdict ought to be reduced by a percentage of her fault. A court might take the
position that, in the hypothetical dealt with in the text where the plaintiff's negligence
is in the driving of the car, the car manufacturer's liability goes to protect the negligent
and non-negligent alike. In the Horn case the negligence of the plaintiff was in a sense
identical with that of the defendant. If the defendant failed to take precautions to
protect the plaintiff in the event of collision (from second collision injuries), it must
be admitted that the plaintiff failed to take precautions to prevent second collision
injuries as well. These issues are difficult and will require careful attention by the
courts. The position of the majority declining to consider comparative negligence in a
strict liability situation and that of the dissent in uncritically accepting the doctrine
both seem wrong.
117. Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
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it should be unthinkable to reduce plaintiff's recovery by the
percentage of his fault for the original collision. If the judgment
is made that the design of the vehicle was in fact unreasonable,
it is because the defendant has a duty to design against the
possible effects of collisions. This takes into account the possi-
bility of collisions which are brought about through the plain-
tiff's fault and those in which he has been faultless. It is simply
not reasonable to conclude that defendant's design
modifications to make the auto crashworthy are for the benefit
of only faultless plaintiffs. We know otherwise. To either excul-
pate the defendant or to permit the reduction of total damages
based on the fact that plaintiff had also been at fault is to
demean the very process in which we determined that defen-
dant's design was substandard.
Hypothetical (2) should, in my opinion, be analyzed in a
similar vein. Admittedly, in this case plaintiff's speeding has
contributed to the harm. Had plaintiff been traveling at the
appropriate speed limit, he would have been able to bring his
car under control. The car did, however, go out of control due
to a defect in the tire. If, for example, plaintiff was traveling
65 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone, should his recovery
be reduced in an action brought against the tire manufacturer?
The defendant had a clear duty to make a tire that was beaded
properly and that could operate under normal driving condi-
tions. While plaintiff's conduct is negligent vis-a-vis the world
at large, it is not negligent to the defendant tire manufacturer.
If plaintiff contributed to his own injury, the beneficiary ought
not to be the tire manufacturer. Indeed, if one is speeding at
twenty miles per hour over the limit, he is truly in need of a
good tire with proper beading. If this was guaranteed to him
by the law of products liability, he should not be deprived of
the guarantee merely because he has decided to test the war-
ranty."8 Yet, an across the board application of the compara-
tive negligence doctrine may reduce the plaintiff's recovery
substantially.
One might argue that in the above circumstances the plain-
tiff was involved in foreseeable misuses of the product in con-
duct which is not product directed, i.e., the contributory negli-
118. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939);
Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971). See also 2 L. FRUMER &
M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.0113] (1976).
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gence is of a general nature in which the product only played a
secondary role, and thus the plaintiff should not be affected by
compative negligence. However, there are instances when the
plaintiff's conduct is directed toward a deficiency in the prod-
uct where it also seems that it is inappropriate to reduce plain-
tiff's verdict by the percentage of his fault. Hypothetical
(3) where plaintiff has his hand cut off by the unguarded cut-
ting edge of a glass cutting machine exemplifies the problem.
Here it is clear that plaintiff is in a sense pitting his wits
against the machine. He hopes to release the jamming of the
machine and to prevent further damage to the machinery. The
real question is: should a guard at the point of operation have
been introduced to reduce the chance that a dedicated em-
ployee afraid that an expensive piece of equipment will be
damaged will be protected against risk of injury to himself? If
the answer to that question is in the affirmative, it is difficult
to justify reducing plaintiff's verdict when he is injured by
absence of the very mechanism which should have protected
him in the first place.
The problem with comparative negligence is that it is the
great compromiser. It permits a court the luxury of evading
fundamental policy questions, and once it is introduced it has
a life of its own which blinds courts to the policy questions
which they might otherwise be required to face. There is al-
ready evidence that this has happened in Wisconsin. In Schuh
v. Fox River Tractor Co.,' 9 the court faced the problem of
whether the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was equal
to or greater than that of the defendant. The defect alleged in
this case was that a corn blower had a lever which was posi-
tioned so that it could mislead a user to believe that he was
shutting off power to the entire machine. The plaintiff testified
that he believed that when he pulled the clutch lever of the
tractor it turned off the entire crop blower, both the auger and
the fan. In reality the pulling of the clutch lever did not shut
off the power take-off from the tractor to the crop blower. Thus,
while the auger of the crop blower stopped, the fan continued
to operate. Plaintiff, believing that the power was off, stood on
the edge of the hopper of the crop blower in order to place a
chain that had come loose onto the sprocket of the conveyer.
119. 63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974).
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He slipped from his position and his left leg became entangled
in the fan and was ultimately amputated.
The jury came in with a verdict finding the plaintiff forty
percent negligent and the defendant sixty percent at fault. The
court on appeal found the jury was entitled to credit the plain-
tiff's story that he believed that, due to the deceptive location
of the clutch lever, he was in fact turning off the power to the
entire blower machine. And then in a strange turnabout the
court found that, because of his previous experience with the
machine both on the day of the accident and a year prior
thereto, plaintiff should have known that the fan continued to
operate. As a matter of law the plaintiff's negligence was equal
to or greater than that of the defendant.
The result is extraordinary to say the least. If the product
defect was that it could mislead employees who because of
their lack of experience, lack of intelligence, or simple forget-
fulness would believe that the clutch lever cut off power to the
entire blower, then that defect was operative in this very case.
If we believe plaintiff, as the court says we have a right to do,
then he was the very kind of person for whom a nondeceptive
lever was necessary. To then turn around and to hold that as a
matter of law his negligence exceeds that of the defendant is
not understandable. It is to march up the hill in order to march
right down.
This does not mean that there may not be appropriate cir-
cumstances where the plaintiff's fault ought to reduce the re-
covery based on the percentage of his fault. 2 ' Where plaintiff
120. The recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) illustrates the kinds of policy
decisions that courts must face before deciding whether to allow comparative negli-
gence as a defense. The case did not deal with the comparative negligence question
but the facts present the problem in a sharp fashion. The plaintiff was killed when a
helicopter he was flying failed to go into autorotation causing the aircraft to crash.
Plaintiff took off that day with a close-to-empty gasoline tank. When the helicopter
apparently went out of fuel, he attempted to put it into autorotation; however, the
pitch stick was designed such that autorotation had to be accomplished within one
second. The design defect alleged in this case was that one second was too short a
period for a pilot to put this life-saving mechanism into operation. There were two
kinds of plaintiff fault alleged in this case (both under the guise of "abnormal use"):
(1) plaintiff failed to engage the autorotation mechanism quickly enough (within one
second) and (2) plaintiff took off in the helicopter with a close-to-empty gasoline tank.
The court held that the two kinds of plaintiff behavior described above should not
bar the plaintiff. The plaintiff's failure to engage the pitch stick quickly enough could
not be grounds for barring the plaintiff. As the court pointed out, the plaintiff's entire
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voluntarily and unreasonably encounters a known risk, it may
be that his recovery should be reduced. I have discussed this
problem at length in another forum.' 2' We must, however, be
extremely careful that contributory fault does not negate or
lessen the plaintiff's recovery when the very harm which should
have been protected against materializes. It could be argued
that since the defect must be the proximate cause of the harm,
every form of plaintiff's conduct which is covered within the
ambit of proximate cause would under the above argument be
precluded from comparative negligence. The above argument
stops far short of reaching that conclusion. It is, however, my
contention that before a court decides to recognize the doctrine
of comparative fault in a products case it give careful consider-
ation to whether it is negating the very reason for deciding that
defendant's product is defective. The words of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.'22 on
this question are most persuasive:
case rested on the issue of the time necessary for autorotation. As to the plaintiff's
taking off with an empty gas tank, the court said, "The autorotation system is a safety
device existing for the sole purpose of preventing a crash in the event of engine failure
for any reason. The reason the engine failed is irrelevant." Id. at 98, 337 A.2d at 901.
Although my argument in the text would tend to support the court's reasoning, it
should be clear that two very different kinds of policy decisions were made by the court.
As to the first form of plaintiff's negligent conduct in failing to quickly engage the
autorotation system, even if we can agree that a reasonable plaintiff would have acted
more quickly, one can easily sympathize with the court's opinion that the defendant's
negligence went to the heart of the plaintiff's contention of defect in this case. If there
should be a pitch stick which engages the autorotation system that takes two seconds,
then plaintiff should not have his recovery affected by the fact that he may have been
negligent as well. The defendant's design was defective because it failed to account
for that very eventuality. I would thus take the position that plaintiff's recovery should
not be affected by comparative negligence.
The second form of plaintiff's negligence (taking off with an empty gas tank) is a
much closer question. My own personal opinion is that the court is quite correct insofar
as the defendant should have designed the autorotation system so that it would work
properly in case of engine failure-any kind of failure. Yet, I would not consider
outrageous a holding by a court that this was a proper case for the imposition of
comparative fault. There is something relatively foolhardy about taking off in a heli-
copter with an empty gasoline tank that commends the case for a consideration of
plaintiff's fault.
The point to be made is that serious policy decisions will have to be made before
engaging the comparative fault mechanism. It will have to reflect the judgment of the
court as to the proper allocation of burdens given the nature of the product, the kinds
of plaintiffs that tend to use the product, etc. The over-simplistic categories created
for the discussion of plaintiff's fault simply will not do.
121. Twerski, Old Wine In A New Flask, supra note 31.
122. 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
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The asserted negligence of plaintiff-placing his hand
under the ram while at the same time depressing the foot
pedal-was the very eventuality the safety devices were de-
signed to guard against. It would be anomalous to hold that
defendant has a duty to install safety devices but a breach
of that duty results in no liability for the very injury the duty
was meant to protect against.'2
CONCLUSION
Fifteen years into the modern era of products liability law
there is as yet no clear recognition that the litigation problems
created by this new class of cases require a new set of perspec-
tives. We have instead borrowed from our past experience with
negligence with little appreciation that the problems we now
face, whether they be in establishing the definition of defect,
allocating burdens of proof or evaluating the affirmative defen-
ses, require direct confrontation of the sensitive problem of the
interaction of user and product. This interaction must now
come to the surface in the development of legal doctrine. The
issue is not how the problems will be resolved when and if they
are confronted. Reasonable men can differ as to the right and
wrong of the matter. Failure to confront the problems can lead
to nothing else but a highly confusing and inconsistent body of
law.
123. Id. at -, 290 A.2d at 286.
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